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1. Introduction 
 
 
In Western Europe today, an estimated 6 million people live in so-called 
high-rise housing estates. Together with Central and Eastern Europe 
(excluding former USSR), the total estimate amounts to 40 million 
(Wassenberg et al, 2004, pp. 1-12). Most of these large-scale, pre-fabricated 
estates were built during the 1960s and 1970s. Today, many of these 
housing estates are in imminent need of regeneration as they suffer from 
physical deterioration – a deterioration often interconnected with a plethora 
of social issues (ibid., pp. 11-12).  
 According to SABO (2009), the Swedish Association of Public Housing 
Companies, this is also the case for a large number of housing estates in 
Sweden. Even though the physical deterioration of the estates might not be 
as advanced as in some other countries (especially on the other side of the 
former ‘iron curtain’), it is very much a pressing political issue – where 
‘sustainability’ seem to be the main argument for regeneration, and funding 
possibilities seem to be the main obstacle. In Sweden, roughly 650.000 out 
of the 830.000 apartments (in multi-family estates) built during the so-called 
‘record years’ (1961-1975) are said to be in need of some form of 
renovation (Industrifakta, 2008, p. 28)1. The most common issue being the 
need for new electrical systems capable of handling the increased use of 
electrical appliances; but also kitchens, bathrooms, windows, facades, and 
main piping systems are believed to be in need of replacement or renovation 
(ibid.). According to SABO (2009, p. 7), the need for renovation can be 
divided into four categories: technical flaws, stricter societal demands, 
social factors, and the need for market adjustment (valid only for public 
housing companies, see section 3.3 for a more detailed account).  Indeed, 
the problem at hand is presented as a national problem of how to sustainably 
renew these neighbourhoods with regards to social, environmental, and 
economical factors. 
 Unlike in many European countries, Swedish urban policies aimed at 
combatting segregation, poverty and ‘social decline’ have traditionally not 
involved physical regeneration measures directed towards specific so-called 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods. This has mainly to do with the perception 
that the social problematic attributed these neighbourhoods is fundamentally 
not a result of poor urban design or milieu, or, even less so, poor housing 
standards. This problematic has traditionally rather been understood as the 
expression of structural, racialised social exclusion (Andersson, 2006,  
p. 787-91; Andersson et al., 2010, p. 250). Therefore, Swedish urban 
policies concerning the ‘social’ have largely been focused on educational 
and labour market measures rather than physical regeneration ditto.  
In recent years, however, efforts interconnecting social and physical 
measures in targeted so-called disadvantaged neighbourhoods have 
surfaced. One such effort is the municipal-led Regeneration Dialogue 
(Bygga om-dialogen) in Lindängen, Malmö. Lindängen is a neighbourhood 
with a rental housing stock exclusively owned by private landlords. The aim 
of the initiative is to develop an area-based social and environmental 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 As Industrifakta is a private corporation, the source should be regarded as potentially 
questionable. Even so, this is also the source SABO (2009) refers to when estimating the 
renovation need of Sweden’s public housing stock.   
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investment fund, through which private and public actors’ future savings 
could finance investments made today, making these future savings 
possible. In Lindängen, a large share of these investments would be directed 
towards renovation of the privately owned rental housing and a regeneration 
of the neighbourhood centre. The development of the Regeneration 
Dialogue was suggested by the so-called Malmö Commission as a social 
investment measure aimed at reducing residential segregation and to use 
physical investments as a driver of local job creation and urban 
development.  
 The so-called Social investment perspective entails a certain 
understanding of social policy, where social expenditure is seen as 
investments rather than mere costs. However, the meaning of social 
investments can range from seeking an entire restructuring of the modern 
welfare state, to more or less shallow reformulations of anything ‘social’ 
into economic terms. 
 In many similar Neighbourhoods throughout Sweden, both public and 
private landlords struggle with the seeming conundrum of funding 
renovation of their rental housing stock without consequently having to 
greatly increase rents. The establishment of an area-based social and 
environmental investment fund in Lindängen is believed to make such 
renovations possible without resulting in renewal-induced rent increases too 
great to bear for its more precarious tenants. As of now, Trianon, one of the 
three private landlords in Lindängen, have committed to partake in such 
renovation strategies. These regeneration efforts are not solely direct 
towards the physical housing stock, but they are also aimed at improving the 
social circumstances for its tenants. This is believed to be realised, to a large 
extent, through so-called social mobilisation and local job creation measures 
– where existing tenants are employed to work in the actual renovation 
process or maintenance of the buildings and their surroundings. 
Furthermore, the neighbourhood regeneration at large is believed to create a 
number of different jobs besides the aforementioned jobs in construction 
and maintenance.   
 In this thesis, the argumentation for such social investment strategies, as 
suggested by the Malmö Commission, is traced – from its ideopolitical 
origin to the substantiation of them through the development of the 
Regeneration Dialogue.  
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1.1 Aim and Research Questions 
Targeted urban renewal schemes, especially in disadvantaged neigh-
bourhoods, tent to stir up debate concerning the supposed positive or 
negative social implications of its outcome. On the one hand, proponents 
argue for its positive neighbourhood effects, economic growth stimulation, 
and potential for bonding and bridging social capital, not uncommonly 
coupled with ‘social mix’ overtones. On the other hand, critics are 
concerned with the (in)justices of existing residents, indicating that urban 
renewal schemes, especially extensive housing renovations, sometimes 
result in rampant rent increases causing financial dire straits for existing 
tenants, or even, at worst, displacement. The Regeneration Dialogue 
initiative expresses a concern for the matter of rampant rent increases as a 
potential negative outcome of urban renewal. It does so by explicitly 
drawing on storylines of social investment strategies and calls for a physical 
regeneration of the neighbourhood stimulated in concurrence with social 
change. Not only does it conceptualise a symbiosis between the social 
sphere and the physical environment in the renewal process, it also 
expresses awareness of social justice and a will for deflecting negative 
social effects. The purpose with this thesis is to study the discursively 
constructed need for social investment strategies as reproduced in the 
municipal-led initiative the Regeneration Dialogue in Lindängen, Malmö. 
Therefore, the aim with this thesis is to (discursively) addresses the 
following central research question: 
 
Is the implementation of social investment strategies in the 
regeneration of Lindängen said to help deflect renewal-induced 
negative social outcomes for existing tenants? 
 
In order to address this central research question, two supporting questions 
are raised. First, the emergence of social investment policies and strategies 
in Swedish urban planning, particularly as expressed in the Regeneration 
Dialogue, needs to be examined. Therefore, the first supporting question 
reads: 
 
What is the Social Investment Perspective and can it be discerned in the 
works of the Malmö Commission and in the regeneration of Lindängen? 
 
This question is answered both empirically and with the aid of literature. 
Secondly, to understand what the social investment strategies possibly can 
help deflect or counteract, such potential outcomes and a scholarly overview 
of them will be examined. Therefore, the third supporting question reads:   
 
What negative social outcomes for existing tenants could potentially be 
induced by neighbourhood regeneration?  
 
This question will be addressed in chapter 3 with the use of literature 
concerning urban regeneration, gentrification, and housing renovation. 
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1.2 Thesis outline  
This Master’s thesis is divided into seven chapters. Following this thesis 
outline, and concluding this introductory chapter, is a short presentation of 
the neighbourhood Lindängen. Chapter 2, Methodology, starts by outlining 
the philosophical and theoretical foundations for this study. Then the 
theoretical and methodological ‘package-deal’ that is discourse analysis is 
explained. Here particular emphasis is given to Maarten Hajer’s so-called 
argumentative discourse analysis as it aids the operationalization of my 
analysis. Thereafter I explain what concrete methods I have used to produce 
my data, and I give an account of how the study as been conducted, what 
considerations I have taken, and so forth. In chapter 3, Urban Regeneration 
and Social Justice, an auxiliary theoretical frame of reference for this thesis 
is presented. This chapter is an overview of academic literature on the 
subjects of gentrification, housing renovation, and the concept of 
‘renoviction’. Also, the concept of Social Justice is discussed in relation to 
planning. Chapter 4, The Social investment Perspective, is an overview of 
literature on the so-called social investment perspective. This chapter differs 
a little from chapter 3 because it starts to slip into the subsequent analysis 
part. Chapter 5, The Malmö Commission, is the first of two analytical 
chapters in which I present and analyse my empirics in relation to the 
literature presented in chapters 3 and 4. Here I start to discern discourses 
identified in the works of the Malmö Commission. Chapter 6, The 
Regeneration Dialogue, is the second analytical chapter in which I move 
onto studying the Regeneration Dialogue. Here I identify an overarching 
discourse-coalition united by a common understanding of what the 
Regeneration Dialogue is and what it entails. This is done by discerning 
storylines that seem to enable this common understanding. Chapter 7, 
Concluding Remarks and Reflections, concludes this thesis and reconnects 
to the research questions. I also present some critical reflections on the 
findings.   
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1.3 A Brief Account of Lindängen 
Lindängen is a neighbourhood at the southern fringe of Malmö just outside 
the Inner Ring Road, a motorway encircling most of the conurbation that 
constitutes the city of Malmö. The neighbourhood was developed during the 
Million Homes Programme, a grandiose national planning programme that 
spanned between 1965-1974, during which approximately one million new 
dwellings were built (Hall & Vidén, 2004, p. 301). However, in reality the 
construction boom stretched from 1961-1975, the so-called record years, 
during which some 1.4 million dwellings were built. The distribution 
between apartments and single-family houses built during the record years 
(and the Million Homes Programme too) was 66 and 34 per cent 
respectively (Hall & Vidén, 2004, p. 304). The bulk of buildings and neigh-
bourhoods developed during the record years are in fairly good condition, 
and has kept so with routine maintenance. However, some multifamily 
housing neighbourhoods are in need of more or less extensive renovation 
(Hall & Vidén, 2004, p. 301), Lindängen (arguably) being one such 
neighbourhood.  
 The first general plan for Lindängen was developed in 1967 and most 
buildings were built between 1969-1973, with some additional buildings 
added around 1980 (Tykesson, 2002, p. 108-19). The buildings are 
exclusively multifamily housing, ranging from 3 to 8 storeys high (and one 
16 storey building). Lindängen can be divided into two distinct areas based 
on housing tenure; one area consists of some 1 000 apartments that are 
tenant-owned (Bostadsrätt)2, and the other area consists of some 1 700 
rental apartments (Malmö municipality, 2013a, p. 5). The rental housing 
estates constitute the core of what is perceived as Lindängen, whereas the 
tenant-owned housing estates called Högaholm, although statistically also 
part of Lindängen, are geographically separated from the rental housing 
estates. Three private landlords manage the rental housing estates in 
Lindängen; Stena owns 631 apartments, Willhem owns 681 apartments, and 
Trianon owns 400 apartments  (Blomé, 2013, p. 5). Residential turnover (in 
rental apartments) has in recent years been around 20 per cent (ibid.). From 
here on in this thesis, reference to Lindängen will entail only these rental 
housing estates. In 2009, the whole of Lindängen, including the tenant-
owned housing area Högaholm, had a population of 6 700 residents, out of 
which 67 per cent was of ‘foreign origin’3, and an employment rate (of 
people 18-64 years) at 47 per cent; this compared with Malmö as a whole 
that had an employment rate at just over 60 per cent (Malmö municipality, 
2013a, p. 5; Stigendal & Östergren, 2013, p. 163). In the school year of 
2010/ 2011, 46 per cent of the 9th grade secondary school pupils passed all 
subjects; this compared with nine years earlier, when 68 per cent passed 
(Blomé, 2013, p. 5).  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 A tenant-owned apartment is ‘neither owner-occupation, nor rental. Instead, the occupier 
of an individual residential unit /…/ is a member and shareholder of a co-operative /…/ that 
itself owns the unit in question, together with one or more others /…/ To acquire a share in 
the co-operative, a new resident pays a fee; in return, he or she gets the right to use a 
specific dwelling unit for an unspecified, unlimited period of time, and to transfer this right 
to a new resident/shareholder’ (Christophers, 2013, p. 889) 
3 A person born outside Sweden or a person whose both parents are born outside Sweden is 
considered to be of foreign origin (Statistics Sweden, 2008, p. 76) 
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Trianon’s apartments in Lindängen are situated in the sub-neighbourhood of  
Fruängen, consisting of three eight-storey buildings and three three-storey 
buildings. Fruängen is located just south of the southeastern bend of 
Munkhättegatan as show in figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Map of Lindängen. The dashed black line encircles the administrative sub-district 
Lindängen. Source: Malmö municipality, 2014a 
 
Figure 2. Map of Lindängen in Malmö. Red circle indicates Lindängen’s position in 
Malmö. Source: Malmö Municipality, 2014b  
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Lindängen could be descried as a so-called disadvantaged neighbourhood. 
Malmö, along with many other Swedish and European cities, is to a large 
extent spatially divided between the native and immigrant population. In 
Sweden, this ethnic segregation is also coincident with a socioeconomic 
segregation, or as Åsa Bråmå (2006, p. 9) asserts, ‘Swedish high-income 
households live in certain parts of the cities while low-income immigrant 
households live in other parts, often at a considerable distance from one 
another’.  
 In a longitudinal study of population dynamics and socioeconomic 
conditions in Lindängen from 1990 to 2010, Tapio Salonen, professor of 
Social Work at Malmö University, shows that (the rental housing part of) 
Lindängen over the past two decades have been a neighbourhood in 
transition. From 1994 to 2010, the population in Lindängen grew from 
2 312 to 3 588; that is an increase of 55.2 per cent. Noteworthy is that this 
sharp population increase has occurred without the construction of any new 
buildings. Simultaneously, Lindängen has also had a high turnover rate, and 
between 1990 and 2010, two thirds of the population lived in Lindängen no 
longer than five years; 25.3 per cent lived in Lindängen no longer than one 
year, and only 2.3 per cent lived in Lindängen all years (Salonen, 2014).    
 The data presented in Salonen’s study is a high-resolution statistics at 
the neighbourhood or housing estate-level4. As such, the tenant-owned 
housing area Högaholm is excluded. Trianon’s housing estates in Lindängen 
are confined to a single SAMS, while Stena and Willhem’s housing estates 
together make up one SAMS. These two SAMS combined constitute the 
rental housing part of Lindängen. In the tables below, statistics for 
Lindängen is shown in comparison with Malmö as a whole and the 
neighbourhood of Herrgården – arguably the most socioeconomically 
disadvantaged neighbourhood in Sweden. The neighbourhood of 
Herrgården is confined to a single SAMS.  
 
 
Country of 
Birth 
Lindängen 
1991       2000         2010 
Herrgården 
1991      2000       2010 
Malmö 
1991      2000     2010 
Sweden  58 61 50 38 29 35 84 77 70  
Nordic/Western 
Europe 
8 6 5 7 1 3 5 4 6 
Outside Western 
Europe 
34 34 45 55 70 62 11 19 24 
Total (%) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Table 1. Country of Birth as Percentage of Total Population, in Lindängen, 
Herrgården and Malmö, 1991, 2000 & 2010. Source: Salonen, 2014 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  The data is from Statistics Sweden (Statistiska Centralbyrån) and its research database 
LISA (Longitudinal integration database for health insurance and labour market studies). 
The data is for the geographical statistical area of SAMS (small areas for market statistics)  
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Source of income, 2010 Lindängen  
                    %            
Herrgården 
               %                      
Malmö  
      % 
Total population 
 
2 247 100 2 522 100 194 753 100 
Disposable income 
 
2 054 91,4 2 224 88,2 176 859 90,8 
No income 
 
193 8,6 298 11,8 17 894 9,2 
Income from employment 1 224 54,5 667 26,4 137 596 70,7 
Student grants 
 
277 12,3 427 16,9 26 492 13,6 
Parental insurance 
 
330 14,7 376 14,9 27 091 13,9 
Housing benefit 
 
688 30,6 1 462 58 19 002 9,8 
Social welfare 
 
630 28 1 451 57,5 18 689 9,6 
Unemployment insurance 
 
189 8,4 122 4,8 12 421 6,4 
Labour market related 
payments 
 
221 9,8 290 11,5 13 167 6,8 
Table 2. Source of Income, Individuals 18-64 years, 2010. Source: Salonen, 2014 
 
Table 1 shows that Lindängen and Herrgården both have a larger share of 
residents born outside Sweden, and outside Western Europe for that matter, 
than Malmö as a whole. Table 2 shows that income from employment is 
substantially less in Lindängen and Herrgården than in Malmö, and that 
income from public transfers are greater. The combination of table 1 and 2 
expresses the fact that socioeconomically disadvantaged neighbourhoods in 
Sweden often have a large share of immigrants and/or residents of foreign 
origin (Andersson, 2006, pp. 787-91; Andersson et al., 2010, p. 250; Bråmå, 
2006, p. 10). Bråmå (ibid.) argues that the poorest neighbourhoods in 
Sweden almost always have a large share of immigrants. Residential 
segregation in Sweden is thus constituted by both socioeconomic and 
ethnical factors. Andersson and Andersson et al. (ibid.) explain this spatial 
division as the expression of structural racialised social exclusion.  
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2. Methodology 
 
 
This chapter begins by establishing the philosophical foundations for this 
thesis. Thereafter discourse and discourse analysis is discussed, with a 
further examination of Maarten A. Hajer’s discourse analytical approach 
called argumentative discourse analysis. The chapter is then concluded with 
practical notions of concrete methods used when conducting this study.  
As such, the chapter moves from the abstract and philosophical, through the 
meso-level of discourse analysis, to explaining concrete research actions 
and considerations taken. This thesis rests on a discourse analytical 
‘package-deal’ of theory and methodology, and, therefore, this chapter is 
also very much my theoretical framework.  
 
2.1 Philosophical Foundations   
When conducting a discourse analysis, no matter what discourse analytical 
theories and methods one chooses to work with, there are always a number 
of assumptions about reality one needs to reconcile with. The most 
fundamental assumption is that all knowledge is socially constructed, and, 
therefore, reality can never be unambiguously reflected (Börjesson & 
Palmblad, 2007, p. 9). In other words, there is no independent (meaningful) 
reality unbound from perspective. Such assumptions are characteristic of 
what is usually termed ‘the linguistic turn’ – a historical shift away from the 
strict positivist epistemology.  The linguistic turn implies a consideration of 
the importance of language for the social, and that language is perceived as 
an action, an activity, and not as a complete system or a reflection of reality; 
as soon a language is used to represent things and occurrences context is 
created, and, thus, reality is constructed (Börjesson & Palmblad, 2007, p. 
10). What has been described above is fundamental to social 
constructionism as a theory of knowledge. Vivien Burr (1995, pp. 2-5) 
speaks of four key premises that are essential to the social constructionist 
perspective. If one identifies any of these four premises as foundational for 
ones understanding of knowledge, one can be said to hold a social 
constructionist position. The four key premises are:  
 
• A critical stance towards taken-for-granted knowledge 
Our knowledge about the world is not a reflection of reality. 
Reality is made accessible to us only through categories that shape 
our conception of the world. There is no objective truth.  
 
• Historical and cultural specificity  
Our knowledge of the world is shaped by our history and culture, 
i.e. everything wee see and understand is historically and culturally 
relative. This suggests an anti-essentialist perception in which 
humans does not have a predetermined ‘inner essence’. 
 
• Knowledge is sustained by social processes 
As our knowledge of the world is not something derived from 
nature – something objectively ‘out there’ – knowledge is created 
between people, through social interaction.  
 
 13	  
• Knowledge and social interaction go together 
Our socially constructed knowledge about reality creates different 
forms of action, as certain actions are perceived as ‘natural’ while 
other are perceived as ‘inconceivable’.  
 
Whereas the die-hard social constructionist standpoint is that nothing exists 
outside the discourse and that there is no independent reality unbound from 
perspective, critical realism can offer a more ‘nuanced’ ontology. From a 
critical realist perspective, there is a reality independent from humans’ 
perception of it; that is, so to speak, the realist part of it. Its other 
constituent, the critical, is about being critical of what appears to exist; what 
appears to be reality cannot be taken for granted, neither can what is said or 
though about reality (Stigendal, 2002, p. 56). Amalgamating these two 
perspectives – social constructionism and critical realism – can very much 
be possible (depending on ones conception of either philosophy). It is also 
the standpoint from which this thesis is written; namely the assumption that 
there is a reality independent from humans’ perception of it, yet all 
knowledge we have of reality are just constructions, which, in turn, must be 
perceived of critically.  
 As I am constrained by limited time and scope for this thesis, the 
analysis is consequentially confined to a ‘less critical’ approach. I will, 
however, bring up some critical remarks in the concluding chapter. 
 
2.2 Discourse and Discourse Analysis 
Although frequently used in the humanities and social studies, there is no 
clear consensus as to what constitutes a discourse or how to analyse them. 
One all-encompassing definition of discourse is that it is a certain way of 
speaking about and understanding the world (Winther Jørgensen & Phillips, 
2000, p. 7; Börjesson & Palmblad, 2007, p. 13). For an aspiring discourse 
analyst, this might not seem to be of much help. But, because discourse is a 
certain way of speaking about and understanding the world, what follows is 
that these linguistic representations are bound to a structure in which these 
representations are made acceptable and perceived as true or reasonable. 
Concurrently, language can always offer different, alternative versions of 
‘reality’ outside this structure. Therefore, there is no single valid repre-
sentation of ‘reality’, just different versions of it (ibid.); and, as Chantal 
Mouffe argues, ‘[t]hings could always be otherwise and therefore every 
order is predicated on the exclusion of other possibilities’ (Mouffe, 2005, p. 
18).  
 Echoing discourse analysis’ social constructionist legacy, every 
(historically specific) representation is bound to a particular perspective; 
that is, every articulation is selected and produced from a certain perspective 
and a certain position. This makes the representations themselves – the 
discourse(s) – the subject of study in a discourse analysis, and the analyst is 
not seeking some underlying, actual explanation of what someone ‘really 
thinks’ (Winther Jørgensen & Phillips, 2000, p. 28; Börjesson & Palmblad, 
2007, p. 16). In other words, because reality is a social construct, ‘the 
analysis of meaning becomes central’ (Hajer & Versteeg, 2006, p. 176). A 
discourse can theoretically be perceived of as ‘closed’ or fixed in meaning; 
it does, however, always have ‘loose-ends’ or ambiguous elements (Wreder, 
2007, p. 35). A discousre is always contingent, that is, always floating in 
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significance and never completely fixed. At best, a discourse can 
temporarily be fixed in meaning and significance within a certain domain 
(Winther Jørgensen & Phillips, 2000, p. 33).  
 One scholar that has made seminal contributions for discourse-informed 
research is Michel Foucault. Foucault describes discourse not just as 
language but as other forms of social practice as well. To Foucault, a 
discourse both define and produce what we have knowledge of and it 
governs how people can speak, write or relate to a subject meaningfully. As 
such, at the same time, a discourse excludes any other representations of 
that same subject (Hall, 1997. p. 73). One of Foucault’s contributions to 
discourse analysis is that a discourse can be seen as ‘a complex set of 
competing ideas and values, all of which are actualised in our everyday 
practices’ (Jacobs, 2006, p. 44). To Foucault, discourse plays a key role in 
establishing so-called ‘regimes of truth’, which acts as the foundations from 
which our understanding of the social world is asserted, and where 
formulations of problems and solutions are rendered acceptable (ibid.).  
A concept that is closely related to regimes of truth is hegemony.  
 
Hegemony 
Discourses that at a given moment have the privileged position to define 
reality are called hegemonic (Thörn, 2007, p. 71). Hegemonic discourses are 
perceived as natural or ‘objective’ and are so rooted that they exclude other 
ways to perceive reality. This ‘objective’ status is attained through 
histocical sedimentation. Chantal Mouffe calls the order of, or the struggle 
between, the hegemonic and the counter-hegemonic ‘the political’. On the 
contingent nature of a discourse and the constant struggle for hegemony, 
Mouffe argues that 
 
What is at a given moment considered as the ‘natural’ order – jointly 
with the ‘common sense’ which accompanies it – is the result of 
sedimented practices; it is never the manifestation of a deeper 
objectivity exterior to the practices that bring it into being […] Every 
order is political and based on some form of exclusion. There are 
always other possibilities that have been repressed and that can be 
reactivated. The articulatory practices through which a certain order is 
established and the meaning of social institutions is fixed are 
‘hegemonic practices’. Every hegemonic order is susceptible of being 
challenged by counter-hegemonic practices, i.e. practices which will 
attempt to disarticulate the existing order so as to install another form of 
hegemony (Mouffe, 2005, p. 18).  
 
Hegemony can thus bee understood as an organisation, or an order, of 
consent. This consent can neutralise and make power relations appear as 
natural and unquestionable (Winther Jørgensen & Phillips, 2000, p. 39). 
With this struggle for hegemony in mind, Hajer’s argumentative discourse 
analysis will be discussed.  
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2.3 Argumentative Discourse Analysis 
In aiding the discourse-informed analysis in this thesis, and as a way to 
‘operationalize’ discourse analysis, Maarten A. Hajer’s ‘conceptual appa-
ratus’ of discourses, discourse-coalitions, and storylines will be employed. 
Hajer developed what he calls argumentative discourse analysis analysing 
environmental politics and the emergence of ecological modernisation in the 
1980s and 1990s – yet it is an approach that is highly suitable for analysing 
any form of hegemonic or contending policy. Hajer argues that it is im-
portant to study specific constructions of reality, whether it may be the 
hegemonic status quo sought to be upheld by key actors, or forces seeking 
to oppose such constructions (Hajer, 1995, p. 55).  
 
A struggle for hegemony 
While studying environmental politics in the 1980s and 1990s, Hajer was 
intrigued with how the so-called ‘acid rain’ controversy seemed to play a 
pivotal role in environmental politics. This informed his thesis that ‘acid 
rain’ functioned as a vehicle to discuss environmental issues at large, and 
that acid rain ‘seemed emblematic of the bigger “problematic” or, more 
precisely, for understanding that problematic at the time’ (Hajer, 2005, p. 
298, original emphasis). To Hajer, then, acid rain functioned as a metaphor 
– it stood for something else, something broader. In the 1980s, acid rain was 
seen as the reason for various environmental problems, such as the fact that 
a large number of trees were dying throughout Europe’s forests. As such, 
acid rain functioned as a way to make sense of, for example, dead trees 
(Hajer, 2005, 299). Given this construction, the dead trees were seen as the 
victims of acid rain pollution as opposed to dying from ‘natural causes’. 
Thus a ‘pollution’ narrative, as opposed to a ‘natural causes’ narrative, 
constructed a particular political problem where the metaphor ‘acid rain’ 
facilitated a new understanding of rain as potentially environmentally 
dangerous. Therefore, Hajer argued, ‘[l]anguage has the capacity to make 
politics’ (Hajer, 2005, p. 300) as it can construct problems and offer 
solutions, potentially impacting institutional arrangements and policy-
making.  As language in use, i.e. discursive interaction, can alter the way 
people think and act, or construct new identities for themselves and other, 
discourse play a significant role in political change (Hajer, 1995, p. 59). 
 Like Mouffe, Hajer understands politics as the struggle for discursive 
hegemony, a struggle ‘in which actors try to secure support for their 
definition of reality’ (Hajer, 1995, p. 59). In the argumentative discourse 
analysis approach, the dynamics of this struggle is determined by three 
factors: credibility, acceptability, and trust. An argument needs to be 
credible for actors to ‘permit’ their own position in the structure the 
discourse implies for them; that position must seem attractive or necessary 
for actors to accept it and; trust refers to the securing of confidence in the 
author of the argument, e.g. through a person’s or an institution’s reputation, 
or the ‘trustworthiness’ of the practice through which the argument is 
produced, e.g. a sound democratic process or in a scientific journal (Hajer, 
1995, pp. 59-60). These factors then can determine actors and arguments 
ability to convince, rendering them plausible or unreasonable. Mapped out 
below are concepts key for Hajer argumentative analysis, which will also be 
employed in the forthcoming analysis in this thesis.  
 
 16	  
Discourses 
What constitutes and defines a discourse, and subsequently how it should be 
analysed, varies across time, institutional setting, scientific discipline, 
application, and, not least, the analyst. According to Hajer, a discourse can 
be seen as an argumentative structure, and as an 
 
ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categories through which meaning 
is given to social and physical phenomena, and which is produced 
and reproduced through an identifiable set of practices (Hajer, 2005, 
p. 300). 
 
A discourse analysis, then, is the analysis of this argumentative structure 
and ensemble, and the practices through which they are produced and 
reproduced (Hajer, 2005, p. 299). A discourse can be understood as a 
structure of binding moments and elements to which coherence is made 
dependent on context. For, as Hajer argues, coherence ‘is not an essential 
feature of discourse’ (Hajer, 1995, p. 44). Routinized practices within a 
certain institutional setting make a discourse coherent; a discourse, through 
these practices, produces thus its own criteria of credibility. To use the case 
of acid rain as an example, a discourse can be a certain way of under-
standing and dealing with environmental problems like acid rain, e.g. an 
environmental activist discourse, a political discourse or a natural science 
discourse. Although coming from diverse backgrounds and ‘representing’ 
different discourses, various actors can somehow come together and agree 
on the meaning of certain phenomena and argue for the same cause, like 
combatting acid rain. Hajer explains this ‘communicative miracle’ with the 
concepts of storylines and discourse-coalitions.  
 
Storylines 
A storyline is a narrative on social reality that enables the ‘communicative 
miracle’ that allows actors from different domains (and discourses) to 
somehow form coalitions and common understandings regarding particular 
matters (Hajer, 1995, p. 62). Storylines can reduce discursive complexity 
and help to achieve discursive closure of otherwise fragmented and 
incoherent discourses (Hajer, 1995, pp. 62-3). Through repetition and 
increased patronage, storylines can achieve ritual-like character and become 
almost ‘figures of speech’. A storyline is often centred around shallow and 
ambiguous discursive practices, such as metaphors, ‘analogies, historical 
references, clichés, appeals to collective fears or senses of guilt’  (Hajer, 
1995, p. 63). Hajer calls a storyline a ‘condensed statement summarizing 
complex narratives, used by people as “short hand” in discussions’ (Hajer, 
2005, p. 302); assuming that, because of its ‘figure of speech’-like 
character, others will understand what they mean. This assumed mutual 
understanding is, however, often false, and ‘[e]ven when actors share a 
specific set of storylines, they might interpret the meaning of these 
storylines rather differently. Interestingly enough, actors that can be proven 
not to fully understand each other can still produce meaningful political 
interventions’ (Hajer & Versteeg, 2006, p. 177). Storylines are what 
positions actors in a discourse-coalition, much like how the acid rain 
storyline rendered dead trees victims of pollution, it can render actors as 
problem solvers or perpetrators, credible or absurd; a storyline can also 
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attribute actors and occurrences certain ideas, like ‘”blame” and 
“responsibility”, and of “urgency” and “responsible behavior”’ (Hajer, 
1995, pp. 64-65). However factual or scientific it might be, a storyline must 
be plausible to be successful, and ‘the power of story-lines is essentially 
based on the idea that it sounds right’ (Hajer, 1995, p. 63). A storyline is the 
‘discursive cement’ that binds together different actors drawing on elements 
from various discourses in a discourse-coalition in which the discursive 
complexity is concealed (Hajer, 2005, p. 304).  
 
Discourse-coalitions 
Hajer defines discourse-coalitions as ‘the ensemble of (1) a set of story-
lines; (2) the actors who utter these story-lines; and (3) the practices in 
which this discursive activity is based’ (Hajer, 1995, p. 65). By adhering to 
a specific set of storylines, various actors, often from different backgrounds 
and drawing on different discourses, can be united in a discourse-coalition 
(Hajer, 2005, p. 304). These actors often have different, if not contradictory, 
goals and interests and gives different content and meaning to the shared 
storylines. This implies that just because actors are connected to the same 
discourse or discourse-coalition, they do not necessarily share opinions, 
values, or even a common goal (Hajer 1995, s. 14). As an example, Hajer 
illuminates this ‘intra-coalition’ dynamics with the notion that the economic 
models that ‘neoliberal’ economists draw upon, and the science of 
environmental problems, are indeed so complex that even ‘experts’ draw 
upon storylines to be understood. Also, as these are ‘experts’ in their 
respective fields, they are depended on other ‘experts’ within the discourse-
coalition to see the ‘full picture’ (Hajer, 2005, p. 3).  
 
Structuration and institutionalisation  
In order to apply the above presented concepts ‘in practice’, Hajer agues 
that one should ‘be able to link discourse to power and dominance’ and one 
should also be able ‘to assess their influence as well’ (Hajer, 2005, p. 303). 
To do this, and to determine whether a discourse or a discourse-coalition 
can be seen as dominant in a particular domain, Hajer introduces the terms 
discourse structuration and discourse institutionalization. When the 
rhetorical power of a discourse is so powerful that it dominates how a social 
unit (a person, a corporation, a political institution, a policy field, etc.) 
conceptualizes the world, discourse structuration can be said to have 
occurred. If that discourse also ‘solidifies in particular institutional 
arrangements’ (Hajer, 2005, p. 303) for that particular social unit, i.e. if the 
practices of that social unit ‘is conducted according to the ideas of a given 
discourse’ (Hajer, 2005, p. 305), then also discourse institutionalisation can 
be said to have occurred. A discourse can be said to be hegemonic if both 
these two criteria are fulfilled (Hajer, 1995, p. 61).  
 
Discursive affinity 
In a discourse-coalition, a given phenomena may mean different things for 
its actors, but although their arguments may vary in origin, they can still 
share a mutual conceptualisation of the matter at hand. Hajer calls this 
discursive affinity. He exemplifies this with the moral argument in pollution 
politics that ‘nature should be respected’. The scientist’s argument could be 
that nature is a complex ecosystem, and the economist’s argument could be 
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that pollution prevention is the most economic solution. Although their 
arguments differ, both actors can, from respective positions, agree with the 
other argument because it sounds right and does not contradict the central 
argument that ‘nature should be respected’ (Hajer, 2005, p. 304). 
 
2.4 Method  
In accordance with my discourse analytical approach, my research process 
does not follow the conventional procedure of data collection followed by 
data processing and analysis. A discourse analytical study is rather a 
‘wholeness’ of analysis, and the aforementioned methodological ‘package-
deal’ that is discourse analysis is very much my method (Börjesson & 
Palmblad, 2007, p, 16; Winther Jørgensen & Phillips, 2000, p. 10). 
Therefore, my ‘produced data’, whether it may be interviews, texts, or 
images, is all equally treated as discursive interactions, i.e. language in use. 
Nonetheless, my empirics are divided into (1) primary data, such as 
interviews, observations, and any form of personal communication, and (2) 
secondary data, such as policy documents, newspaper articles, and academic 
literature. 
 
Primary data 
Four semi-structured interviews were conducted for this thesis. The 
interviews lasted for circa 30 to 50 minutes. Three of these interviews were 
recorded and transcribed shortly after the interview. These interviews were 
with Municipal commissioner for labour market affairs, a Housing inspector 
with the Department of Environment, and the Project manager for the MIL 
project (a project closely related to the Regeneration Dialogue, explained 
further in section 6.1). The Municipal commissioner for labour market 
affairs was chosen because he had appeared in media on behalf of his 
interest in the Regeneration Dialogue and its potential as a local job creating 
effort. The interview with the Housing inspector was conducted to get a 
fuller picture of the municipal appreciation of the ‘situation’ in Malmö’s 
Million Homes Programme, Lindängen in particular. The interview with the 
Project manager for MIL was conducted both as a way to get access to 
‘tacit’ information otherwise hard to obtain, such as current situation for 
Regeneration Dialogue, but also to get a detailed account of the aim and 
purpose with the regeneration. It should be mentioned that I met with the 
Project manager for MIL on two other occasions in less informal manner. 
The fourth interview was with the CEO of the private Landlord Trianon 
who owns 400 rental apartments in Lindängen. This interview was not 
recorded, and instead notes were taken. A problem with this is that some 
details and specificities might have gotten lost in the process. Especially for 
a discourse analysis, this can be problematic because the use of certain 
words or articulations can be meaningful for the analysis. Because of this, to 
get answers to some uncertainties a second meeting was appointed and 
conducted as a guided tour in Fruängen, Lindängen. During this tour I also 
hade the opportunity the see one of the renovated apartments. The CEO of 
Trianon was chosen because Trianon is the landlord in Lindängen that, as of 
now, has come the furthest in renovating their housing stock in Lindängen, 
and, in doing so, has also implemented certain socially related aspects in 
renovation process. Apart from these interviews, a telephone interview was 
conducted with the head of commercial policy for the southern regional 
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subsidiary of the Swedish Property Federation, a national property owners’ 
trade association. The intention with this interview was to inquire whether 
they, as a trade association, hade certain policies or guidelines for landlords 
engaging in local job creation or so-called social value-based real estate 
management. This interview was not recorded but notes were taken.  
 In accordance with my discourse analytical approach, my interviewees 
are not referred to by name, as it is their respective subject positions in the 
discourse(-coalition) that matters rather than who they actually are. All 
interviews were conducted in Swedish and I translated the excerpts that are 
presented in the thesis to English. A list of personal communications can be 
found in the list of references and all the translated excerpts are presented in 
Swedish in the appendix Translated Excerpts.  
 I also had the opportunity to observe a half-day workshop with public 
actors related to the regeneration Lindängen. The topic for the workshop 
was the suggested area-based investment fund for Lindängen and how these 
concerned public actors, e.g. the Social services, the Employment agency, 
etc., perceived this suggested investment fund – its potentials, obstacles, etc. 
– and its demanded inter-sectorial co-operation. Besides this I also had, on 
several occasions, the possibility to meet with Professor Tapio Salonen, 
member of the steering committee for the MIL project, as well as Malmö 
Commissioner. These meetings helped med with orientating my subject of 
study and Salonen supplied me with connections and material relevant for 
my study.  
 The selection of interviewees was made according to their respective 
roles in my discerned discourse-coalition regarding the regeneration of 
Lindängen. I did seek an interview with the project manager for the 
Regeneration Dialogue without any luck. Surely such an interview could 
have given me certain insights that now might be lacking. As Trianon is the 
landlord that has actually committed to partake in certain socially related 
renovation efforts, I considered Trianon to be the most important landlord to 
hear. Another approach could have been to also interview the other two 
landlords to inquire their ‘less advanced’ role in the Regeneration Dialogue. 
Also, my initial intention was to do a comparative study between Trianon 
and their efforts in Lindängen and Victoria Park and their similar efforts in 
Herrgården. This idea was shelved due to limitations in time, and also on a 
stronger focus on the Regeneration Dialogue as a direct ‘derivation’ of the 
Malmö Commission.  
 
Secondary data 
My secondary data consist of, for example, public policy documents, 
planning documents, newspaper articles, academic articles and books, maps, 
illustrations, etc. Also, much of my secondary data was obtained via per-
sonal communications, especially such data that concerns the Regeneration 
Dialogue and the MIL project. This type of data mostly consists of internal 
material that would otherwise be hard to come by, like project descriptions, 
halfway reports, etc. All documents regarding the Regeneration Dialogue 
and the Malmö Commission is in Swedish and thus translated to English by 
me, with the exception of an essay written in English by the project manager 
for the Regeneration Dialogue. 
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My position  
As a discourse analyst, I have myself constructed the framework for the 
subject of study by discerning discourses, the ‘abstraction level’ of them, 
and who is included or not. My research questions and my selection of data 
constructs this framework, and, in other words, it is I that contextualises and 
deems something meaningful or not. As such, I am also part of the 
production and reproduction of the discourses that I study (Börjesson & 
Palmblad, 2007, p. 19). Therefore, it is important to justify ones selections 
and to account for whose context is studied.  
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3. Urban Regeneration and Social Justice 
 
 
In this chapter, theories and practices related to urban regeneration and 
social justice will be presented. This chapter serves as an auxiliary 
theoretical frame of reference informing this thesis. It also answers the third 
supporting research question What negative social outcomes for existing 
tenants could potentially be induced by neighbourhood regeneration? But 
first, a brief account of Swedish housing policy is in place.  
 
3.1 Swedish Housing Policy  
Sprung out of a severe housing shortage and widespread unsanitary living 
conditions, the Commission on Housing and Redevelopment of 1933-1947 
(bostadssociala utredningen) set the stage for Swedish housing policy that 
for decades remained a staple of the Swedish social democratic welfare 
state. Fundamental to this housing policy was the notion of sound and aff-
ordable housing for all (Boverket, 2007, pp. 9-10). In the 1960s, this policy 
culminated in the Million Home Programme and the goal to build a million 
new dwellings between 1965 and 1974 (Boverket, 2007, p. 12). However, 
just a few years into the 1970s, the housing shortage had in some places 
turned into a housing surplus and many buildings, indeed whole housing 
areas, were half-empty (Hall & Vidén, 2005, p. 304).  
 The policy advocated for by the Commission on Housing and 
Redevelopment remained for the most part in ‘effect’ up until the early 
1990s (Clark & Hedin, 2009, p. 176). From here on, the Swedish housing 
sector came to experience radical transformations inline with a more 
neoliberal trajectory. The Carl Bilt government of 1991-1994, the first 
liberal-conservative government in Sweden since 1930, engaged a series of 
state ‘roll-backs’, including nullification of housing legislation, the closing 
of the Department of Housing, and the discontinuing of housing related 
subsidies, etc. (Clark & Hedin, 2009, p. 180). Although the Social 
democrats regained office for two consecutive terms between 1994-2006, 
little was done to reinstate what had been ‘rolled-back’, but ‘[r]ather, under 
the leadership of Ingvar Carlsson (1994-96) and Göran Persson (1996-
2006), the system switch was tacitly endorsed’ (Clark & Hedin, 2009, p. 
181).  Since 2006, a liberal-conservative coalition government has been in 
office further abolishing welfare systems and pursing over-all privatization 
schemes. In 2008, the long-standing goal of sound and affordable housing 
for all was thwarted, and the goal for housing was now instead said to be a 
‘well-functioning housing market where consumers’ demands meet a supply 
of housing which correspond to their needs’ (Clark & Hedin, 2009, p. 183). 
In 2011, another formative shift towards increased marketization took place 
with the instating of a new law, the so-called Allbolagen (SFS 2010:879). In 
short, the legislation stipulated that public housing companies now also 
must conduct their activities in a ‘business-like’ manner, altering the public 
benefit role of Swedish housing companies (for discussions on what this 
might entail, se for example Christophers, 2013, p. 893; Baeten & 
Listerborn, Forthcoming, p. 11).          
 On the back of this this development, many scholars have commented 
on the far-reaching neoliberalisation of the Swedish housing sector, 
although not entirely alike. For example, whereas real estate economists 
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Lind & Lundström argue that Sweden has ‘gradually become one of the 
most liberal market-governed housing markets in the Western world’ (Lind 
& Lundström, 2007, cited in Hedin et al., 2012, p. 444), Christophers, on 
the other hand, maintain a slightly more reserved position, arguing that the 
Swedish housing system rather should be seen as a (monstrous) ‘hybrid of 
legacy regulated elements on the one hand and neoliberalised elements on 
the other’ (Christophers, 2013, 885). Either case, the situation today is that 
Sweden is again facing a shortage of affordable rental housing, at least in 
the larger cities. The recently established Housing crisis committee 
(Bokriskommittén) – a private initiative run by the chambers of commerce 
for Stockholm, western, and southern Sweden, and the Swedish Property 
Federation – suggest that this should be addressed through (1) further down-
scaling of rent regulation (towards, although not completely, market 
regulated rents), and (2) further legislation intending to ‘speed up’ the 
planning process (Housing Crisis Committee, 2014). Noteworthy is that the 
law that regulates planning and construction was revised as recently as 
2010, very much with the intention to do just that (Plan- och bygglag 
2010:900).   
 SABO, together with The Swedish Union of Tenants and the Swedish 
Property Federation offers another outlook on why there is a shortage of 
affordable housing. They argue that the lack of affordable housing – both 
low production of new ‘affordable’ housing and ‘affordable’ rent levels for 
the existing stock – is largely because of tenure bias in favour of the private 
and tenant-owned tenancy forms. They argue that these tenancy form are 
premiered, partly because of tax cuts and subsidies (both for residents and 
constructions companies), but also because of the abolished, previously 
substantial, subsides for the production of rental apartments (SABO et al., 
2010).   
 One factor that relates to the housing shortage is the fact that Sweden 
has the highest construction prices in the EU. According to Eurostat, the 
price level for investment was 36 per cent higher in Sweden than the EU 
average; this compared with Finland and Denmark who both had a price 
level of investment at 13 per cent above the EU average (Eurostat, 2012). 
The price index for housing construction in Sweden increased with 1 800 
per cent between 1968 and 2010, this compared with the consumer price 
index which increased with 700 per cent for the same years (SABO, 2013, 
p. 2).  
 So in conclusion, soaring construction prices, state ‘roll-backs’ and 
further marketization, unbalanced economic conditions between tenancy 
forms, the new role of public housing companies, and an over-all switch 
from perceiving affordable housing as a ‘right’ to just another commodity –
this all suggests a rather uncertain future for the Swedish housing sector and 
a bleak situation for the financially precarious.    
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3.2 Gentrification 
When dealing with the matter of urban regeneration in disadvantaged neigh-
bourhoods it is hard to disregard the ever-debated concept of gentrification. 
Although gentrification has over the past decades taken many different 
forms and the definition of it has expanded, whether it is a suitable theo-
retical process by which to study the regeneration of Lindängen can be 
questioned. Nevertheless, since the Regeneration Dialogue is a municipal-
initiated regeneration effort operating in a disadvantaged neighbourhood, an 
examination of the concept of gentrification is due.  
 Gentrification is in this thesis principally understood as ‘the trans-
formation of a working-class or vacant area of the central city into middle-
class residential and/or commercial use’ (Lees et al., 2008, p. xv). Although, 
as ‘working-class’ might seem a little narrow, it is here expanded to include 
also the poor or the disadvantaged; and ‘central-city’ is expanded to also 
include more peripheral parts of the city. 
 In 2001, Hackworth and Smith examined the changing state of 
gentrification in the USA and identified three consecutive waves of 
gentrification intermitted by periods of economic recession (Hackworth & 
Smith, 2001, pp. 465-68). Emerging in the 1990s, the third wave of 
gentrification took place further from the city centre and was often more 
linked to large-scale capital, where developers could invest in larger parts 
of, if not entire, neighbourhoods. Also characteristic of this third wave of 
gentrification is that the reworking of neighbourhoods was often done with 
state support. This state supported form of gentrification, often called state-
led gentrification, entails gentrification as (explicitly or implicitly) posited 
as a governmental strategy. State-led gentrification might, if any, be the 
most suitable gentrification ‘variant’ for this thesis as the Regeneration 
Dialogue is in fact a municipal-led regeneration effort. State-led 
gentrification has been discussed by Hackworth and Smith (2000), Cameron 
(2003), Porter and Barber (2006), Larsen and Lund Hansen (2008), 
Davidson (2008), and Watt (2009), only to name a few.  
 Just as the definitions of gentrification has evolved and multiplied, so 
have also opinions about it. Since the beginning of the 2000s, proponents 
arguing for the benefits of gentrification have emerged united by the so-
called ‘emancipatory city’ rhetoric. In short, gentrification proponents argue 
that gentrification is the result of a healthy and thriving real estate market 
and that it creates attractive environments and opportunities for further 
economic development (Hedin, 2010, p. 25). One way to forward gentry-
fication policies is to relate it to the idea of ‘social mix’, which, highly sim-
plified, means to build new or renovate existing housing for high-income 
groups in neighbourhoods predominantly inhabited by low-income groups  
(ibid.). Even though proponents of gentrification and ‘social mix’ strategies 
have emerged, Loretta Lees contends that the language of pro-gentrification 
policies 
  
never uses the word ‘gentrification’ and thus consistently deflects 
criticism and resistance. Terms like urban renaissance, urban 
revitalisation, urban regeneration and urban sustainability are used 
instead, avoiding the class constitution of the processes involved and 
neutralising the negative image that the process of gentrification 
brings with it (Lees, 2008, p. 2452). 
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By this understanding, an urban regeneration project like the Regeneration 
Dialogue certainly falls within the scope of what might be ‘concealed’ 
gentrification policies. However, although the class constitution of the 
project is avoided per se, there are certain aspects of social justice and 
beneficence within the purpose of the project suggesting that gentrification 
is neither an explicit nor an implicit aim. Also, the (socio-)geographical or 
urban morphological preconditions might not be favourable for ‘typical’ 
gentrification, such as the rent-gap5 being too narrow to suggest a potential 
disruptive restructuring of the neighbourhood, or that the Million Homes 
Programme estates’ arguably bleak architectural aesthetic is undesirable to 
‘typical’ middle-class gentryfiers. Nevertheless, displacement can be a 
concern even though the regeneration might not entail processes of 
gentrification. For as Lees et al. (2008, p. 81) argues, ‘reinvestment has 
moved beyond the comparatively small enclaves of gentrification, and is 
moving deeper into other parts of the devalorized urban environment’. Thus, 
one concept that might be more suitable for this thesis is the concept of 
‘renoviction’ that is presented in the following section.   
 
3.3 Renovation and ‘Renoviction’  
A large share of the large-scale, or multi-family estates that was during the 
Million Homes Programme (1965-1974), or more accurately, during the so-
called ‘record years’ (1961-1975), are in need of some form of renovation. 
Industrifakta, a private corporation specialising in market analysis 
concerning the construction and real estate industries, have in a report 
concluded that around 650.000 out of the 830.000 apartments built during 
the ‘record years’ are in need of some form of renovation (Industrifakta, 
2008, p. 28). SABO, the Swedish Association of Public Housing 
Companies, have divided the needs for renovation of their member 
companies stock (that is most, but not all, of Sweden’s public housing 
companies) into four factors: technical flaws, stricter societal demands, 
social factors, and the need for market adjustment (SABO, 2009, p. 7).  
The technical flaws are commonly old main piping and drainage systems 
that needs to be replaced, worn waterproofing in kitchens and bathrooms, 
etc. By stricter societal demands they mean, for example, that the demands 
for energy efficiency and health aspects like the sanitation of PCB and 
asbestos, are stricter now than when the buildings were constructed.  
By social factors they mean that some of the neighbourhoods built during 
the record-years are disadvantaged in terms of unemployment, low-income 
levels, and social welfare dependency. The factors mentioned, although 
formulated for SABOs members companies, very much apply to privately 
owned housing estates as well. The fourth factor – the need for market 
adjustment – concerns, however, only public housing companies and their 
need to adjust to ‘business-like’ principles since fairly recent legislation (the 
so-called Allbolagen, 2011, explained earlier in section 3.1).  
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Neil Smith describes rent gap as ‘the disparity between the potential ground rent level and 
the actual ground rent capitalized under the present land use’ (Smith, 1979, p. 545) 	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Renoviction 
The aforementioned replacements of main piping and drainage systems are 
large and costly interventions. Therefore, such interventions are often 
coupled with major bathroom and kitchen overhauls. While the former is 
considered regular maintenance, the latter, and this is what can become 
‘problematic’, is considered value-adding renovations, permitting the 
landlord to increase the rent as it could increase the apartment’s utility value 
(Westin, 2011, p. 16). As Sweden is facing forthcoming renovations of the 
Million Homes Programmes’, or the record-years’, housing stock on a large 
scale, a growing fear is that such renovations would create ‘unaffordability’ 
for existing tenants, and that what would be created is systematic 
‘renoviction’; that is, evictions as a result of rampant rent increases induced 
by value-adding renovations.  
 This fear is in no way unwarranted. Renovation efforts in dis-
advantaged neighbourhoods that have included value-adding renovations 
have been shown by Baeten & Listerborn (Forthcoming), Ärlemalm (2014), 
and Westin (2011). Westin illustrates instances where neighbourhoods have 
been subjected to extensive renovations resulting in soaring rent increases 
upwards 50-60 per cent (2011, p. 11); for example in Drakenberg, 
Stockholm (Svenska Bostäder, public housing company), Södra 
Kvarngärdet, Uppsala (Uppsala Hem, public housing company), and Norra 
Kvarngärdet, Uppsala (Stena Fastigheter, private housing company). All 
three examples are relatively centrally located Million Homes Programme 
neighbourhoods.  
 Baeten and Listerborn (Forthcoming, p. 12) presents yet another 
example in Uppsala, where private landlord Rikshem have made reno-
vations leading to increased rent levels up to 34 per cent. The examples of 
Rikshem in Uppsala and Drakenberg in Stockholm both led to protests and 
wide media attention, and in the case of Drakenberg protests led to a 
renegotiation of rent levels, bringing them down from circa 60 per cent to 
circa 28-30 per cent (Westin, 2011, p. 11).  
 Some commentators have expressed a concern for the overestimation of 
renovation needs. In her report on renovations in Million Homes 
Programme areas in Stockholm and Uppsala, Sara Westin (2011) studies the 
effects of ‘renoviction’ from tenants’ perspectives. One interlocutor in the 
study, a representative of the Swedish Union of tenants, expresses that the 
supposed ‘need’ for renovation is not so much affected by the actual need 
for renovation, but that it is rather induced by the landlord’s ambition to 
increase rent levels, and that main piping replacements are often used as a 
‘front’ for being able to conduct value-adding renovations, increasing the 
utility-value of the property which in turn allows for rent increases (Westin, 
2011, p. 30. On the subject, Baeten and Listerborn says that ‘[t]he need for 
renovation, so it seems, is invoked to renew the social fabric of 
neighbourhoods where housing profits have not yet been ‘optimised’ 
(Forthcoming, p. 13).  
 Baeten and Listerborn (Forthcoming) have studied the city of 
Landskrona, Sweden, and their controversial so-called Crossroads plan. In 
short, the plan, which is for the central and eastern inner-city Landskrona, 
hopes to reduce the influx of (unwanted) immigrants, it wants incorporate 
more tenant-owned housing, and it seeks to attract a more mixed population, 
i.e. ‘social mix’. These are the more controversial aspects of the plan, but 
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the plan also seeks to, for example, locate more service and business 
establishments to the area. The plan is hoped to be realised through 
renovation, tenure conversion, and demolition of the rental apartments 
(Baeten & Listerborn, Forthcoming, p. 6). Baeten and Listerborn argue that 
such policy formulations are an overthrow of ‘traditional’ Scandinavian 
social concerns and ideas about how to ‘navigate’ disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods (Baeten & Listerborn, Forthcoming, p. 7). Moreover, they 
contend that ‘[i]nstead of getting low-income groups into cities and houses 
– an ordinary social aim for decades – places like Landskrona are now 
actively pursuing the opposite’ (Baeten & Listerborn, Forthcoming, p. 10). 
In conclusion they argue that Landskrona is an example of the introduction 
of ‘renoviction’ efforts in (even small cities in) Sweden. Also, it is seen as 
an example of how the provision of affordable housing is no longer 
considered a ‘cornerstone of the Swedish welfare model’, but it is rather 
part of the problem, ‘since it attracts the “wrong kind of people”’ (Baeten & 
Listerborn, Forthcoming, p. 14).  
 Thus it seems, from what has been discussed about ‘renoviction’, that 
extensive and costly value-adding renovation efforts have been made both 
by private and public housing companies with, at least in some cases, the 
implicit motive to either increase rents and/or to attract other tenants. These 
renovation efforts can not only have detrimental effects for individual 
residents, but also have great impact as ‘vehicles’ for social restructuring at 
the neighbourhood level.   
 
3.4 Social Justice 
According to Flyvbjerg (2002, p. 353) and Fainstein (2010), the prevalent 
communicative focus in planning theory has led to research and practice 
often being too narrowly oriented towards the procedural aspects of 
planning, equally ignoring the substantive or distributional outcomes and its 
significance for social justice. This procedural focus in planning, often 
informed by Habermasian communicative rationality, can in a sense be 
explained as being rooted in a deontological ethical reasoning – where right 
or wrong is derived from the intent of an action rather than its outcome, and 
as long as the procedure is immaculate the outcome is justifiable (Johansson 
& Khakee, 2008, pp. 29-30). In contrast, from a teleological ethical 
perspective, i.e. consequentialism, what is right or wrong is derived from 
the outcome of an action. Off course, in practice, these concepts are not 
dichotomic, and the line between the concepts might not always be clear-
cut.  
 Fainstein argues that the prevalent procedural focus in planning lacks 
ways of dealing with structural inequalities beyond the reach of the ideal 
process or dialogue, or in other words, it lacks conceptualisations of 
substantive justice (2010, p. 20). Fainstein contends that (blind) faith in the 
efficiency of open communication often ignores underlying hierarchies of 
power (2010, pp. 29-30). In a similar vain, Flyvbjerg argues that this is 
partly because ‘[i]deals seem to block the view to reality’ (Flyvbjerg, 2002, 
p. 354), as the separation between rationality and power tend to obscure the 
Realpolitik and ‘real rationality’ of political institutions.  
 Fainstein argues that the claim that meaningful justice can be attained 
within the system of global capitalism can induce two different responses; 
one either believes that (1) ‘it is impossible to work within this system and 
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achieve a modicum of justice’, or that (2) ‘the pressure for nonreformist 
reform can lead to incremental changes in the system that place it on a 
pathway toward justice’ (Fainstein, 2010, p. 170). Fainstein adheres to the 
latter position and, further, calls for the application of an equity criterion in 
policy evaluation, a criterion in which emphasis is on providing affordable 
housing for low-income people, very much reminiscent of the now 
abolished conception of the right to affordable housing that functioned as a 
lodestar in Swedish housing policy for the most part of the 20th century. 
This perspective of seeing planning research and practice having been 
too narrowly focused on procedural aspects is a noteworthy background to 
have in mind when studying the social investment ‘informed’ polices 
forwarded by the Malmö Commission, particularly the development of the 
Regeneration Dialogue and its ‘take’ on urban regeneration.  
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4. The Social Investment Perspective 
 
 
To explain the concept of social investments as something new would 
indeed be misguiding. It has however in recent years become somewhat of a 
fad, particularly for Swedish municipalities and regional organisations, to 
formulate policies as social investment efforts. So then, why this re-
formulation of social interventions, and if it is not something new, where 
did this rationale originate? In this chapter the origin and ‘resurgence’ of the 
social investment perspective will be traced – from 1930s Sweden, through 
the Lisbon Strategy to the concretisation of social investment strategies in 
Malmö.  
 Although emerging as attempts to reformulate the welfare state in the 
1990s (as will be explained later), the social investment perspective can be 
traced back to the 1930s and the cradle of the Swedish social democratic 
welfare state. On the back of the Great Depression, unsanitary living 
conditions and a severe fertility crisis in Sweden, prominent Social 
democrat’s Alva and Gunnar Myrdal outlined what they would call 
productive social policy (Morel et al., 2012a). The Myrdals argued that a 
healthy and educated population was necessary for achieving economic 
growth and high productivity, even in periods of economic crisis. As such, 
social policy was made essential, not only for providing income 
redistribution and individual security, but also for the efficiency of the 
organisation of production. This view merged the national need for 
economic growth and efficiency with the strive for individuals to 
productively partake in the economy. The structural societal impediment 
that Gunnar and Alva Myrdal recognised in Sweden in the 1930, and which 
eventually led to the formulation of their so-called productive social policy, 
can be paralleled with the structural impediments identified by the Malmö 
Commission, which in turn led to the formulation of social investment 
informed policies; the former being embedded in a social democratic 
discourse and the latter in a neoclassical or neoliberal discourse.  
 
A Welfare state in crisis  
The new socioeconomic context of the post-industrial era has arguably 
strained the capacity of the modern welfare state. As a way to reformulate 
the welfare state, various attempts to redefine its goals and instruments 
emerged in the late 1990s (Morel et al., 2012a). Central to these 
redefinitions was the focus on policies aimed at ‘preparing’ rather than 
‘repairing’ (ibid.). Such efforts have called for a ‘developmental’, 
‘activating’, ‘enabling’, ‘third way’, or ‘social investment’ welfare state 
(Cantillon, 2011, p. 439). Whatever the term, what unifies such various 
definitions is their common overall pre-emptive rather than remedial logic. 
In this thesis, such definitions are united under the term social investment 
perspective. 
 Whereas the early modern welfare state was structured according to 
Keynesian demand-side macroeconomics and in which welfare was seen as 
a precondition for economic growth, thus making welfare expenditure 
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productive, the prevalent neoliberal6 state, on the other hand, is structured 
according to supply-side neoclassical macroeconomics, perceiving social 
expenditure merely as costs, and thus, as hindrance for optimal economic 
growth. In neoliberal policies, social expenditure is only acceptable if it 
leads to activating or stimulating people to search for jobs – any jobs – 
regardless of quality or security (Morel et al., 2012a; Stigendal & Östergren, 
2013, p. 22).  
 In the 1990s, the social investment perspective in many respects 
emerged as a critique of the neoliberal agenda (Morel et al., 2012a; Grander, 
2014). This social investment perspective aims to transform the welfare 
state according to the conditions of the so-called knowledge-based 
economy; and in a society where knowledge is key, human capital enhance-
ment becomes critical. From a social investment perspective, as with 
Keynesianism, social policies should be seen as a productive force and a 
precondition for economic growth (Morel et al., 2012a, p. 2). On the other 
hand, and similar to neoliberal policy, emphasis is on ‘active’ rather than 
‘passive’ social policies, in the sense that individuals should be encouraged 
to actively strive for economical self-sufficiency, and not rely on ‘passive’ 
benefits. Anthony Giddens, who coined the term the social investment state, 
and who is commonly associated with the term the ‘Third way’, describe 
this 
The guideline is investment in human capital wherever possible, 
rather than the direct provision of economic maintenance. In place of 
the welfare state we should put the social investment state, operating 
in the context of a positive welfare society (Giddens, 1998, p. 117, 
italics in original).  
 
In the EU, explicit social investment policies began to take form in the late 
1990s, very much inspired by Anthony Giddens’ book The third way: The 
Renewal of Social Democracy (1998). These policies envisioned a welfare 
state transformed from a state reliant on ‘passive’ benefits systems to a 
capacity building, ‘activating’ social investment state (Hemerijck, 2012, p. 
46). This idea of the social investment state functioned as a broader 
framework for the early formulations of the Lisbon Strategy – a EU agenda 
that was devised in 2000 and ended, arguably as a failure, in 2010 
(Cantillon, 2011, p. 439, Diamond and Liddle, 2012, p. 285; Morel et al., 
2012a). The Lisbon Strategy was formulated on the back of rising 
inequalities in the EU during the 1990s. The strategy is said to have grown 
out of discontent with the prevalent neoliberal trajectory; of which critics 
formulated policies united under the social investment parole, suggesting a 
development of economic growth in tandem with a reducing of segregation. 
Even though initially being very much rooted in the notion of a social 
investment state, due to a revision of the strategy in 2005, focus shifted 
towards creating more jobs and economic growth, more or less abandoning 
its initial social investment signature (Grander, 2014, p. 13).   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Neoliberalism is here understood as ‘an overriding belief, verging on the theological, in 
the efficiency of free markets; an associated belief in the unnecessary and malign impact of 
government interventions in the economy; a commitment to winding back government 
regulation and privatizing publicly provided goods and services and; a parallel commitment 
to reducing taxes and transfers, resulting in a further shrinking of the public sector’ (Berry, 
2014, p. 2)	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The Social Investment Perspective Post the Lisbon Strategy 
In the article the paradox of the social investment state: Growth, 
Employment and Poverty in the Lisbon Era, Bea Cantillon seek to explain 
how, even though employment and average income rates have increased, 
relative income poverty remains stagnant or, for some Member states, have 
even become worse after the Lisbon Strategy. A trend that might contribute 
to this development, she argues, is that spending aimed at producing new 
jobs have increased, while ‘passive’ income support, e.g. cash transfers, has 
declined (Cantillon, 2011, p. 445). Even though the social investment 
strategies advocated by the EU have helped to increase employment, the 
jobs created have been of ‘low quality’, e.g. temporary and part-time jobs. 
Therefore, such ‘activating’, pro-employment measures have failed to 
reduce relative income poverty (Cantillon, 2011, p. 437).  
 The social investment perspective lost influence as a result of the 
arguable failure of the Lisbon Strategy, and as Grander explains ‘[a]fter the 
revision of the Lisbon strategy in 2005, the social investment perspective 
cannot be said to have influenced European social policies on macro level’ 
(Grander, 2014, p. 14). However, Diamond and Liddle points out that the 
global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008, a crisis that some argue was the 
culmination of the failures of the prevailing political-economic system 
(Berry, 2014; Diamond and Liddle, 2012, p. 288) ‘[h]ave added a new 
urgency to the debate about the future of social investment’ (Diamond and 
Liddle, 2012, p. 285). Whereas the policies that emerged in the late 1990s 
inspired by Giddens had a strong focus on ‘activation’, more recent 
proponents of the social investment perspective have sought to ‘capture a 
politics in which future welfare costs are to be contained through the 
focusing and targeting of social investment’ (Newman and McKee, 2005, p. 
658). Morel et al. describe the (contemporary) social investment perspective 
as focusing on 
 
public policies that ‘prepare’ individuals, families and societies to adapt 
to various transformations, such as changing career patterns and 
working conditions, the development of new social risks, population 
ageing and climate change, instead of simply generating responses to 
‘repair’ damages after markets fail or existing policies prove 
inadequate. By addressing problems in their infancy, the social 
investment paradigm stands to reduce human suffering, environmental 
degradation and government debt (Morel et al., 2012b, p. 354). 
 
Much seem to point to the social investment perspective as a response to the 
seeming inadequacy of the modern welfare state in the post-industrial era, 
which in turn has been spurred by rising inequalities in the EU, and which 
further gained momentum by the GFC of 2008. The social investment 
perspective is in this thesis understood as a counter-discourse to the 
prevalent neoclassic economical and ‘overall-neoliberal’ hegemony. There 
are, however, structural and institutional constraints that hamper the 
implementation of social investment strategies in the EU (Diamond and 
Liddle, 2012, p. 286). The recent decades of the ‘rolling-back’ of the state, 
and most notably the new public management paradigm, has led to a 
dispersion of responsibility and accountability; a development which in turn 
has created a – to say the least – challenging basis for the counter-arguments 
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of the social investment perspective to effectively enact social investment 
policies in the EU (Diamond and Liddle, 2012, p. 301); and ‘[t]here would 
have to be significant change in the prevailing economic orthodox that 
provides the context for social investment ideas and strategies’ (Diamond 
and Liddle, 2012, p. 286). Even so, ‘[w]e are currently seeing that around 75 
of Sweden’s 290 municipalities are introducing social investment funds, in 
many cases based on a social investment perspective’ (Grander, 2014, p. 
15). Furthermore, different regional bodies, such as Skåne Regional Council 
(Region Skåne), and Region Västra Götaland (Västra Götanlandsregionen), 
are also creating social investment funds or otherwise engaging in social 
investment efforts (SKL, 2014). As such,  
 
it has proved to live on nationally and locally, being seen as a tool for 
creating socially sustainable cities. Despite the duality of the 
perspective, we are seeing that the social investment perspective is 
described as an alternative to the neoliberal development, for example 
in the Commission for a Socially Sustainable Malmö’ (Grander, 2014, 
p. 14).  
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5. The Malmö Commission 
 
 
This chapter introduces the analysis of this thesis. Here the social 
investment argumentation found in the works of the Malmö Commission is 
traced and relevant discourses are identified. The next chapter follows the 
development of the Regeneration Dialogue in Lindängen and here a 
discourse-coalition united by a common understanding of regeneration in 
Lindängen is identified. But first, a brief presentation to the Malmö 
Commission is needed. 
 
5.1 The Malmö Commission: A Brief Introduction 
In 2010, Malmö city council appointed the ‘politically neutral’ Commission 
for a Socially Sustainable Malmö (from here on simply the Malmö 
Commission). The Malmö Commission was appointed to investigate the 
growing inequalities of health in Malmö, and in March 2013 the 
Commission published their final report, Malmö’s way towards a 
Sustainable Future. Health, Welfare and Justice (Malmös väg mot en 
hållbar framtid. Hälsa, välfärd och rättvisa). The purpose of the report was 
to illustrate growing health inequalities within the city of Malmö and to 
suggest measures to tackle this undesired development.  
 This rationale builds on the works of WHOs Commission of Social 
Determinants of Health (CSDH). In the report Closing the Gap in a 
Generation (2008), The CSDH, spearheaded by professor Michael Marmot, 
explains how the circumstances in which people live gives rise to health 
inequalities, and, ‘[t]he conditions in which people live and die are, in turn, 
shaped by political, social, and economic forces’ (CSDH, 2008, p. i).   
That is, social and economic policies are determinative for peoples’ health. 
The CSDH views the reducing of health injustices, between and within 
countries, as an ethical imperative. The Malmö Commission adheres to the 
view that reducing intra-municipal health inequalities is an ethical 
imperative, consequently making it one of five key principles on which the 
Commission’s report is based on. The other four key principles are: a 
holistic sustainability understanding, a sociological and a gender 
perspective, and, of particular interest for this thesis, a social investment 
perspective (Stigendal & Östergren, 2013, p. iii).  
 The final report is written and edited by commissioners Mikael 
Stigendal, professor of sociology, and Per-Olof Östergren, professor of 
Social Medicine. The report is however founded on 31 independent 
background reports written by all the sixteen commissioners. Most of the 
other commissioners are prominent scholars or city officials. In the final 
report, the Malmö Commission suggests 24 goal and 72 measures that the 
city needs to address in order to combat the rising inequalities of health. 
One of these goals is that urban development should contribute to the 
mitigating of residential segregation. One suggested measure to meet this 
goal is to invest in two grand urban renewal projects, namely the Admiral 
City (Amiralsstaden) and the Regeneration Dialogue (Bygga om-dialogen); 
projects for which (rather ambiguously formulated) levels of ambition are 
said to be equal that of the investments made prior to the regeneration of the 
now renowned waterfront project the Western Harbour in Malmö (Stigendal 
& Östergren, 2013, p. 73, p. 163). Another goal expressed in the report is to 
 33	  
‘actively find new ways to stimulate labour market development and the 
growth of new jobs’. The suggested corresponding measure to achieve this 
goal is said to be the ‘use physical investments as a driver for local job 
creation and urban development’. Here the Regeneration Dialogue is said to 
serve as a pilot for the development of a social investment perspective in 
urban planning (Stigendal & Östergren, 2013, p. 110). 
 
5.2 The Malmö Commission’s Social Investment Rationale 
As mentioned in the previous section, the Malmö Commission’s final report 
rests on five key principles: a holistic sustainability understanding, a 
sociological and a gender perspective, a social investment perspective, and 
the principle that reducing intra-municipal health inequalities is an ethical 
imperative (Stigendal & Östergren, 2013, p. iii).  
 When conducting a discourse analysis informed by Hajer’s metho-
dology, these five principles can be translated into five corresponding 
discourses. However, as relevant for this study, only three of these are 
discerned and deployed as analytical distinctions, namely the (1) 
sustainability discourse, (2) the social investment discourse, and, the 
principle dealing with producing more equal outcomes and/or equality of 
opportunity, which will here be termed (3) the social justice discourse. Lets 
start by discerning what is here termed the social investment discourse in 
the works of the Malmö Commission. This discourse is also given the most 
attention, as it is in many ways what informs this thesis.  
 
5.3 The Social Investment Discourse 
 
The Malmö Commission [advocates for] a social investment 
perspective. It is basically about viewing social interventions and 
efforts as investments, not as costs. Investments in people, especially 
during childhood, yield profits in the long term. This leads to, for 
example, that more people finish school and goes on to university, 
and more people work and are able to support themselves and lead a 
healthy life. Fewer people end up in long-term social and economic 
exclusion. From a social investment perspective, it is also important 
to strengthen the relationship between growth and equality of 
welfare, improve the quality of jobs and to emphasize safety as a 
value in itself (Stigendal & Östergren, 2013, pp. i-ii). 
 
In the excerpt above, taken from the Malmö Commission’s final report, the 
Malmö Commission expresses their understanding of what social 
investments are and what they should be directed towards. First and 
foremost, and the tenet of the social investment rationale, the Malmö 
Commission argues that social expenditure should be seen as investments 
and not as mere costs. The Malmö Commission stresses a greater 
connection between economic growth and welfare, and, furthermore, 
equality of welfare is believed to be a precondition for economic growth. 
Also, social investments are expressed as investments in humans, and such 
investments give the greatest return if they are directed towards children.  
This relates to what different conceptions of social investment strategies 
have in common, namely the advocacy of social policy as a productive 
force, and if social policy is productive, then social expenditure should be 
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rechanneled from ‘passive’ to ‘active’ policies (Morel et al., 2012a, pp. 8-
9). Moreover, from a social investment perspective, social policy and 
economic growth is not only mutually reinforcing, but social policy is rather 
a precondition for economic growth (Morel et al., 2012a, p. 11).  
 This view of social policy as potentially productive put forward by the 
Malmö Commission suggests a break with the neoliberal hegemony, which 
posits a trade-off between the social and economic efficiency (Hemerijck, 
2012, p. 46). This ‘break’ is expressed further  
 
One obstacle to think in terms of social investments is that the curr-
ent municipal management reflects a worldview of economic growth 
at the centre and economic sustainability as the only interesting 
aspect. This leaves no room for the idea of social investments. Since 
economic growth is given priority, all expenditure in the social 
sphere, such as school and health care, are seen as costs that ‘divert’ 
resources from economic growth (Stigendal & Ostergren, 2013, pp. 
49-50). 
 
Here the Malmö Commission recognizes a ‘growth-first’ hegemony, which 
is expressed as an inadequate foundation for the notion of social 
investments. As such, the solution – being the implementation of social 
investments – invalidates the prevalent hegemony, for so long as economic 
growth is given unassailable priority, social expenditure will continue to be 
perceived as mere costs diverted from it. Further on in the report, the 
function of social investments is illustrated with the analogy to large-scale 
infrastructure interventions, such as the building of a bridge or a highway, 
which are often justified by their supposed long-term economical benefits7, 
making long-term amortisation of them possible; suggesting that social 
interventions too should be perceived as investments, and, as such, also 
amenable to long-term amortisation (Stigendal & Östergren, 2013, pp. 49-
50). This differentiation of social vis-à-vis more ‘tangible’ interventions –
where the social receives more residual attention –is explained by the 
current prioritisation of economic growth, in which social expenditures are 
perceived as diverting resources from economic growth (Stigendal & 
Östergren, 2013, pp. 49-50).  
 Martin Grander, also studying the works of the Malmö Commission, 
argues that the Malmö Commission’s social investment policy ‘could also 
be seen as a discourse, in the way the Commission could be said to 
represent an alternative to the neoliberal trajectory of the social sphere by 
emphasising the weight of social’ (2014, p. 16, Italics in original); and, he 
argues that this suggests ‘a more Keynesian development of economics’ 
(ibid.). Further, Grander perceives the social investment discourse as a 
discourse of alignment (Grander, 2014, p. 20). The argument to see social 
expenditures not as costs but as investments, he argues, is suggesting a 
resurrection of the social sphere, making the discourse ‘social’. On the other 
hand, as the discourse is produced through the use of financial language, 
e.g. costs and investments, it also contributes to a financial discourse. This, 
he argues, entails the alignment of the economical with the social, and by 
adapting financial language, the social can be quantified and made adaptable 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  For studies arguing that economic benefits from infrastructure interventions often are 
overestimated, c.f. Flyvbjerg, 2007	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to new demands and as such function as a justification of the social. 
However, he also asks whether the emergence of the social investment 
perspective might just be an aligning of the social sphere with the prevalent 
market-oriented development. Janet Newman and Bob McKee, tracing the 
social investment discourse in the policy of New Labour, explains this 
integration of economic and social policy as ‘thinking about the social 
implications of resource decisions at all levels, and focusing investment in 
ways that deliver sustainable social outcomes’ (Newman and McKee, 2005, 
p. 659). 
 In this thesis, the Malmö Commission’s social investment policy is also 
seen as a discourse, in which investments in human capital is stressed, an 
equalisation of social and more tangible interventions is made, and, perhaps 
most importantly, the view that sound and equal welfare is a precondition 
for economic growth.  
 I would, however, argue that the social investment policy is particularly 
different from ‘traditional’ Keynesian ditto, in that the ‘productiveness’ of 
social policy is emphasised more profoundly, entailing a much more long-
term investment in human capital. Although welfare is seen as productive 
and a precondition for economic growth in Keynesian economics, 
accommodating sufficient welfare (for example through temporary cash 
transfers in the case of unemployment or sickness) is very much oriented 
towards meeting the need of the here-and-now, whereas the social 
investment rationale is more oriented towards ‘strategic’ human 
development (Morel et al., 2012a).  
 In any case, there seem to be a suggested break with the current 
neoliberal trajectory, in which social expenditure is seen merely as costs. 
The policies propagated by the Malmö Commission are deemed credible on 
the basis of the ‘trustworthiness’ of its originators (prominent scientists 
from a wide array of disciplines, as well as high-ranking city officials). 
Also, the very practice in which these policies are produced, namely by a 
‘politically neutral’ commission, further contributes the trustworthiness of 
the arguments forwarded.      
 In conclusion, by drawing on the social investment discourse, the 
Malmö Commission presents the prevalent neoliberal ‘growth-first’ 
hegemony as the main obstacle for dealing with the inequalities of health in 
Malmö, to which the concept of social investments is formulated as a 
counter-discourse potentially capable of solving the problems Malmö faces. 
This resonates with contemporary proponents of the social investment 
perspective, in which the social investment state is seen as a ‘package-deal’ 
where deep-rooted assumptions of social policy and economics – indeed the 
entire welfare regime – need to be reappraised. 
 In an attempt to link the discerned Social investment discourse to power 
and dominance by assessing its influence, as Hajer suggests (Hajer, 2005, p. 
303), there have occurred a structuration of the Social investment discourse 
within the Malmö Commission, given that the social investment rationale 
takes a prominent role in conceptualising what should be done in Malmö. 
Likewise, there has occurred an institutionalisation of the Social investment 
discourse within the Malmö Commission; the actual forming of the 
commission and the producing of the report suggests this. Also, and more 
importantly, through the Malmö Commission’s final report there seem to 
have, to some degree, occurred both structuration and institutionalisation of 
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the Social investment discourse in Malmö municipality’s social policy 
domain. This contention is rooted in the assumption that an articulated shift 
– from perceiving social expenditures as remedial costs to pre-emptive 
investments – has (at least rhetorically) taken place. It appears that, through 
explicit policy formulation, the social investment discourse has been 
translated into institutional arrangements at the municipal level, (partly) 
manifested in the development of the Regeneration Dialogue and the 
suggested implementation of an area-based social investment fund. Given 
Hajer’s methodology, this would suggest the discourse to be hegemonic.  
I would, however, not argue that the social investment discourse is 
hegemonic in the domain of social policy as this would entail that the 
discourse would be perceived as the ‘natural’ order and that all other 
perceptions of how social policy is to be conducted would be considered 
inconceivable. 
 
5.4 The Holistic Sustainability Discourse 
As shown above, elements of the social investment discourse have certain 
prominence in the Malmö Commission’s final report. However, the social 
investment discourse does not stand on its one as a counter-argument 
against predominant public policy. As will shown, it seems that the social 
investment discourse draws on ideas and concepts from the more 
established discourse of holistic sustainability. The following excerpt from 
the Malmö Commission’s final report illustrates an intricate relationship 
between the holistic sustainability and the social investment discourses  
 
We need measures of all three aspects [of sustainability] to be able 
to determine whether a development is really sustainable […] purely 
economic investments alone are not sufficient. Environmental and 
social investments, that is, investments that benefit environmental 
and social sustainability, are also needed. Malmö has been 
internationally acclaimed for its environmental investments, but the 
same approach has not been developed regarding social 
sustainability (Stigendal & Östergren, 2013, p. 49). 
 
Here investments are described as what promotes or leads to sustainability, 
e.g. social investments lead to social sustainability. At the same time, 
investments are also the measures by which one can determine whether 
something is sustainable. As such, social investments are expressed as 
needed, not only to promote social sustainability, but also to determine its 
actual sustainability. Or as Grander argues, ‘[i]n the [Malmö Commission’s] 
discussion of social sustainability, the social investment perspective seems 
to be regarded as part of a solution to the social problems of modern cities’ 
(Grander, 2014, p. 15). The social investment discourse is here fuzzily 
interconnected with, and structured according to, more ‘uncontested’ 
concepts of the holistic sustainability discourse.  
 The credibility of the social investment discourse is thus somewhat 
dependent on the sustainability discourse; and the social investment 
discourse is made acceptable by drawing on and connecting to the more 
established sustainability discourse. Simultaneously, it appears that the 
sustainability discourse is itself transformed through financial language. For 
example, what previously might have read something like ‘Malmö has been 
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internationally acclaimed for its work with environmental sustainability’, 
now instead reads ‘Malmö has been internationally acclaimed for its 
environmental investments’.  
 So, it appears, the sustainability discourse is here reformulated to draw 
on economic language reproduced by the social investment discourse. 
Perhaps it is just, in this particular articulation, a way to further establish the 
social investment concept. It might also be that the sustainability discourse 
reproduces ‘economic’ concepts of the social investment discourse as a way 
of making the sustainability discourse more readable and accepted. Perhaps 
the sustainability discourse, like the social sphere as expressed by Grander 
in section 5.3, draws on economical language to be made credible.  
 
5.5 The Social Justice Discourse 
As mentioned in section 5.1, The Malmö Commission believes that 
reducing intra-municipal health inequalities is an ethical imperative, and this 
is expressed as one of five key principles guiding the commission’s work. 
As this concerns the actual health outcomes and its unequal distribution, this 
is here discerned as a social justice discourse. 
 The Malmö Commission’s final report proposes two general 
recommendations that they argue should be considered in order to address 
the inequalities of health in Malmö. The first recommendation deals with 
what should be done, which is to establish a social investment policy to 
equalise the disparities in living conditions and to make society more equal 
(Stigendal & Östergren, 2013, p. 49). This resonates with what could be 
described as substantive or distributive social justice (Fainstein, 2010; 
Ferrari, 2012; Nylund, 2014; Rawls, 1973; Cornelius & Wallace, 2011). The 
second recommendation deals with how it should be done, namely, in short, 
through the creation of knowledge alliances and more democratic 
governance processes (Stigendal & Östergren, 2013, p. 452). This resonates 
with what could be described as procedural social justice (Fainstein, 2012; 
Ferrari, 2012; Nylund, 2014 Rawls, 1973; Cornelius & Wallace, 2011).  
 In a recent publication, Katarina Nylund, professor of Urban Planning at 
Malmö University, recognises the emergence of the Malmö Commission as 
somewhat contradictory when compared to the prevailing comprehensive 
planning discourse in Malmö (2014). Nylund’s analysis takes its point of 
departure in the concept of social justice and its division between procedural 
and substantive justice (2014, p. 4). Compared to the current and previous 
comprehensive plans for Malmö, the pending but not yet appointed 
Comprehensive Plan 2012 has, according to Nylund, a downplayed focus on 
substantive justice. The Malmö Commission, however, presents in their 
final report radical and far-reaching proposals for a more just city  (2014, 
pp. 11-12). The most promising of these proposals, she argues, is the 
suggestion to ‘invest the same amount of money in two of the poorest 
districts [Lindängen and Rosengård] as has been spent in the western 
harbor’ (Nylund, 2014, p. 18). This focus on improving substantive justice 
in Malmö is noteworthy, especially as it stands in direct contrast to the 
pending comprehensive plan, which lacks such conceptualisations of justice. 
One possible explanation for their differences regarding social justice, 
Nylund discusses, might be the serious riots that occurred in December 
2008 in Herrgården, Malmö, propelled by the closing of a basement-mosque 
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in Herrgården8. The revision of the comprehensive plan is a long process 
that was well under way when the riots occurred, thus making the process 
less responsive of such specific events. The Malmö Commission, however, 
was founded only one year after the riots and was therefore much more 
attentive to the riots, which was seen as symptomatic of social injustices 
affecting certain groups of people living in certain areas of the city (Nylund, 
2014, p. 16). Another reason, Nylund discusses, might be that the riots, as a 
politically destabilising event, actually opened up a possibility for 
counterforces contending the hegemonic growth-first discourse (as 
explained in section 5.3) to further their ideas about social justice in the city 
(Nylund, 2014, p. 17).  
 Despite this focus on social justice in Malmö, Nylund finds ‘it is strange 
that there is no serious discussion of redistribution, though reallocating 
resources from one district to another would seem to be a precondition for 
bridging the present implementation gap between great visions and poor 
results in practice’ (2014, p. 18). Further, Nylund questions the actual 
political significance of the Malmö Commission’s policies, as she argues 
that ‘[t]he status of the report from the Social Commission [the Malmö 
Commission] vis-à-vis comprehensive planning is, however, still quite 
unclear’ (2014, p. 12). Nevertheless its somewhat unclear status, the Malmö 
Commission’s report have led to substantive actions, not least by the very 
establishment of the Regeneration Dialogue and the potentially forthcoming 
investment fund. Also, a new Department of Care and Welfare has recently 
been instated in Malmö. The new department is the result of a 
reorganisation of the City Office and is a merger of three previous 
departments, with the added responsibility of certain planning issues, such 
as the Malmö Commission, the Area Programmes, and public health issues 
(Malmö municipality, 2014c). As such, policies forwarded by the Malmö 
Commission drawing on a social justice discourse have, at least to some 
degree, been institutionalised in the domain of municipal social policy.  
 As explained in section 3.4, both Fainstein (2010) and Flyvbjerg (2002) 
considers the prevalent communicative focus in planning theory to have led 
to research often being too narrowly oriented towards the procedural aspects 
of planning. Given this procedural focus, it is noteworthy that the Malmö 
Commission takes a stand for considering substantive justice outcomes of 
urban policy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  For an in-depth study on the events, see Hallin et al., 2010	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6. The Regeneration Dialogue 
 
 
In this second part of the analysis I will illustrate what I have a discerned as 
a discourse-coalition united by a common understanding of how and why a 
regeneration of Lindängen should be conducted. Also discerned are three 
storylines that functions as its ‘discursive cement’, making such a dispersed 
communicative network ‘with different or at best overlapping perceptions 
and understandings’ possible (Hajer, 1995, p. 63). But first, a presentation 
of the Regeneration Dialogue is needed. In this analysis, the Regeneration 
Dialogue figures as the substantiation of a social investment strategy as 
advocated by the Malmö Commission.  
 
6.1 The Regeneration Dialogue: A Brief Introduction  
The Regeneration Dialogue can be explained as an area-based urban 
regeneration initiative lobbying to achieve a major regeneration of 
Lindängen. As suggested by the Malmö Commission, the project was 
initiated in the summer of 2012 and is run by the Environment Department 
in cooperation with the City Planning Office. The project aims to renovate 
the rental housing stock, regenerate the neighbourhood centre, and to 
renovate the local primary school. In this thesis, focus is on the aim to 
renovate the rental housing stock. This aim is pursued by trying to 
encourage the private landlords in Lindängen to take part in so-called social 
investment strategies when renovating their housing. How this social 
investment-informed regeneration is to be conducted rests on two 
fundamental notions: (1) the landlords are to actively engage in local job 
creation measures. That is, they should employ local residents in the process 
of renovating the buildings and surroundings. In this thesis, this 
argumentation is discerned as a social mobilisation storyline. But, since it is 
hard to motivate private landlord to engage in major renovation efforts 
without having to greatly increase rents, a (2) social and environmental 
investment fund needs to be created. This investment fund would entail a 
merger of public and private monies to create a fund where ‘future savings’ 
can be used today to finance these investments; investments that, in turn, is 
what makes these future savings possible (Stigendal and Östergren, 2013, p. 
163). This fund, then, is believed to make the suggested extensive 
regeneration of Lindängen possible. In practice, such a fund would 
somehow require the public to lend, or ‘invest’, money that private 
landlords and other related businesses could take part of.  In this thesis, this 
argumentation is discerned as an investment fund storyline. The two 
storylines presented above, which are expressed as fundamental to how the 
regeneration is to be carried out, both rest on an assumption of why 
regeneration is needed. This assumption is that Lindängen has a certain 
‘problematic’ that needs to be addressed. In this thesis, this assumption is 
discerned as a deterioration storyline. Before these three storylines are 
presented in detail and shown how they relate to a ‘regeneration in 
Lindängen’ discourse-coalition, the works of two macroeconomists that 
have been formative for this argumentation is presented. Also, a project that 
is closely related to the Regeneration Dialogue, the MIL project, will be 
described. 
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‘Costs of exclusion’ 
One academic source that is pivotal for the regeneration of Lindängen is the 
works of macroeconomists Ingvar Nilsson and Anders Wadeskog. During 
the last few years, their model for calculating the ‘costs of exclusion’ have 
been highly influential, not least for municipalities across Sweden. This 
model can generally be explained as simultaneously tackling the physical 
real estate problem – deteriorating buildings – and the social problems; or, 
as they themselves call it, the physical and the social capital. The 
fundamental idea is that restoring the physical capital, i.e. restoring real 
estate value, is pointless if not done in tandem with the far more 
comprehensive problem of restoring the social capital, which in turn is 
expressed as a precondition for reducing social exclusion (Nilsson & 
Wadeskog, 2013, p. 2; Nilsson & Lundmark, 2012, p. 39).  
 In their report on Lindängen, Nilsson and Wadeskog roughly estimates 
that the cost of the physical regeneration need is estimated to 1 Billion SEK, 
whereas the cost of the social regeneration need is estimated to 5-10 Billion 
SEK (Nilsson & Wadeskog, 2013, p. 9). In other words, reducing the social 
costs is the major task at hand. These ‘social costs’ consists of four parts: 
the loss of production value as a consequence of people not working; the 
costs of different pre-emptive interventions, such as health care or drug 
rehabilitation; public transfer payments, such as social welfare or 
unemployment insurance, and; the loss of taxes due to unemployment 
(Nilsson & Wadeskog, 2013, pp. 12-13). Nilsson and Wadeskog calls the 
process of ‘restoring the social capital’ – i.e. reducing the aforementioned 
social costs of a neighbourhood – social mobilisation. As most of the 
aforementioned social costs derive from people not working, their 
understanding of social mobilisation is to a large extent about creating jobs.   
 To sum up Nilsson and Wadeskog’s approach, both the physical, real 
estate problems and the social problems of a neighbourhood need to be 
addressed simultaneously. The physical problems are addressed by restoring 
real estate value, which is done by renovating the buildings. The social 
problems are addressed by reducing the social ‘costs of exclusion’ (tax 
losses, loss of production value, etc.). This is done through a social 
mobilisation process, principally entailing that people need to ‘move’ from 
unemployment to employment. Nilsson and Wadeskog (2013, p. 2) use the 
term the social investment perspective to describe this approach.  
      
The MIL project 
The MIL project (Method, Information, and Learning concerning Million 
Homes Programme regeneration as a tool for integration) is a project closely 
related to the Regeneration Dialogue. The MIL project is run the 
Environment Department in cooperation with the City Planning Office, and 
Malmö University. The MIL project, like the Regeneration Dialogue, also 
builds on the recommendations of the Malmö Commission and its main aim 
is to develop methods and strategies for how to carry out ‘integrative’ 
regeneration of Million Homes Programme neighbourhoods, particularly by 
drawing on the Regeneration Dialogue as an example (Malmö municipality, 
2013a, p. 9). As such, it operates sort of like a ‘knowledge (re)producing’, 
ongoing evaluation project (principally) following the development of the 
Regeneration Dialogue.  
 
 41	  
6.2 Discerning a Discourse-coalition  
By adopting a discourse analytical perspective informed by Hajer’s 
Argumentative discourse analysis, I have discerned a discourse-coalition of 
actors united by a common understanding of how and why a social 
investment ‘informed’ regeneration of Lindängen is needed.  
 This common understanding is ‘enabled’ by storylines that act as 
credible and/or attractive narratives that gives meaning to the matter at 
hand, namely the regeneration of Lindängen. As told through a ‘meta-
narrative’, the discerned storylines binding this discourse-coalition are (1) 
the housing produced during the Million Homes Programme is physically 
(as well as socially and environmentally) deteriorating and must thus be 
regenerated. This regeneration will be extensive and costly; but, fortunately, 
(2) this (physical) regeneration can, if coupled with social investment 
strategies, result in social as well as ecological benefits. This will be realised 
through a process of social mobilisation, which, in turn, can also help 
deflect regeneration-induced negative outcomes, and as such, if attained, 
justifies the regeneration efforts: and (3) the development of an area-based 
investment fund will make this development possible. The potentially 
successful implementation of such a fund depends on a holistic 
understanding of the ‘costs of exclusion’.  
 Each of the storylines presented in this chapter can be understood as the 
reduction and temporary closure of much broader underlying discussions 
and understandings of that particular matter, or as Hajer explain, ‘[e]ach 
story-line replaces complex disciplinary debates’ (1995, p. 65).  	  
6.3 The Deterioration Storyline 
The first and most fundamental storyline for the discerned discourse-
coalition defines and constructs the problem at hand, namely that many 
Million Homes Programme areas (along with their European counterparts) 
are physically deteriorating. This physical deterioration is often expressed as 
going hand in hand with a spectrum of social and environmental issues.  
As this storyline defines the problem, it is also what enables the other two 
storylines that are more solution and implementation-oriented.  
 The deterioration storyline is here seen as emblematic in the sense that 
it is a way to understand and relate to a larger problematic. By talking about 
deteriorating buildings in Lindängen one can also talk about the neigh-
bourhood as being in ‘social decline’, or about how these buildings are 
consuming too much energy, etc. Deterioration becomes a trope on which to 
‘hinge’ other issues. For example, defining the neighbourhood as deterior-
ating allows for raising issues of who is to blame, or how to address it, etc. 
Thus, for example, new forms of welfare polices can be presented as 
solutions, as ‘needed’.  
 As such, the deterioration storyline is in many ways emblematic for 
contemporary municipal and (national and European) welfare policy in the 
same way that Hajer’s acid rain storyline was for European environmental 
politics in the 1980s and 1990s. For Hajer, the storyline of acid rain and the 
meanings attached to it served as an emblematic starting point from which 
one could study wider trends in the environmental discourse.  
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The excerpt below is taken from an essay written by the project manager for 
the Regeneration Dialogue and expresses the storyline’s emblematic 
‘nature’ 
 
Neglected buildings, green-house emissions, child poverty– this is 
the situation in many of Europe’s tower-blocks. Could these 
problems be turned into the foundation for new forms of 
cooperation, better use of public money and true place-making with 
people at the centre? This approach is now being tried out in the 
“Regeneration dialogue” in Lindängen, an area of apartment blocks 
built in the 1970s, with employment levels below 50% in Malmö, 
Sweden (Stenquist, 2013, p. 76). 
 
Here the deteriorating state of many high-rise housing estates across Europe 
is evoked, indirectly suggesting this is also the case for Lindängen. This 
deterioration –‘these problems’ – comprises physical or tangible (‘neglected 
buildings’), environmental (‘green-house emissions’) and social (‘child 
poverty’) problems. This problem description is then followed by suggested 
viable solutions like ‘new forms of cooperation’, ‘better use of public 
money’, and ‘true place-making with people at the centre’. These solutions 
concurrently also imply that public money is spent unwisely and that 
bottom-up place-making and sufficient forms of cooperation does not exist, 
and that this is also part of the problem. This can be related to the social 
investment discourse and to how Lundvall and Lorenz understand social 
investments, namely as ‘public expenditure that combines the solution of 
social problems with enhancing economic performance’ (Lundvall and 
Lorenz, 2012, cited in Morel et al., 2012b, p. 354).  
 The deterioration storyline is a powerful metaphor of ‘Europe’s tower-
blocks’, in which ‘neglected buildings’ evokes images of run-down, pest-
infested apartments. ‘Child poverty’ is here seen as the reproduction of the 
social justice discourse, as this unjust situation – children in poverty – justly 
needs to be addressed. ‘Greenhouse emissions’ reproduces the sustainability 
discourse and indicates a well-established environmental problem. As such, 
doing something about the ‘situation’ seems hard to disagree with, 
especially if ‘these problems can be turned into the foundation’ for viable 
solutions. For, as Hajer argues, ‘the power of story-lines is essentially based 
on the idea that it sounds right’ (Hajer, 1995, p. 63).  
 Furthermore, The term ‘neglected’ infers that someone is to blame. 
Also, it entails certain actors’ failures, more specifically the failure of the 
landlord to provide sufficient maintenance. ‘Green-house emissions’ does 
not suggest specific actors’ failures, but rather points to environmental 
inefficiency of the buildings due to old age and new understandings of 
environmental risks. Environmental inefficiency is also what connects the 
regeneration of Lindängen with Malmö municipality’s overall environ-
mental goal, which is to reduce energy consumption with 20 per cent per 
person by 2020, and yet another 20 per cent by 2030. Also, the goal is that 
the entire city’s energy consumption should by 2030 be from 100 per cent 
renewable energy (Malmö Municipality, 2009, p. 7). ‘Child poverty’ and 
low employment levels does not infer that someone in particular is to blame, 
but rather, if anything, it points to a structural flaw of the European welfare 
states that fail to prevent child poverty and spatial segregation. Even so, it is 
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ascribed locally to Lindängen or ‘Europe’s tower-blocks’.  
 To sum up, the utterance above ascribes the Regeneration Dialogue a 
‘problem solving’ position and a sort of ‘responsible behaviour’ as it sets 
out to address the dire situation illustrated. This suggests the deterioration 
storyline’s emblematic nature as actors can ‘hinge’ on other matters to it. 
For example, the possibility to discuss the precarious social situation in 
‘Europe’s tower-blocks’, which in turn, allows discussing the need for new 
modes of governance.   
 The CEO of Trianon (Interview C, 2014) expresses a slightly different 
perception of the buildings’ deteriorating state. He argues that when ‘they’ 
(the politicians) talk about the need for renovating the Million Homes 
Programme stock, ‘they’, on the one hand, ‘aim too high’. That is, he means 
that the renovation does not have to be as extensive as is often suggested, 
and he refers to Trianon’s own model for ‘basic’ renovation (explained late 
in this in section), which, he argues, is sufficient yet would not burden 
residents with rampant rent increases. On the other hand, he believes that 
‘they’ exaggerate the supposed poor condition of the Million Homes 
Programme housing stock. He says that some neighbourhoods (in Sweden) 
have been in such poor condition as described but that this is a disappearing 
problem as landlords increasingly have to (sometimes forced to) renovate 
their stock. On this notion he also refers to the state of Lindängen, saying 
that ‘it is not as bad as some describe it’, and ‘surely there are problems but 
not at that scale’. Even though he disagrees with the extensiveness of 
renovation needed and the supposed poor condition of Million Homes 
Programme housing stock, he still acknowledges the need for renovation. 
He does explains that there is a difference between owning and managing 
housing in Lindängen as opposed to housing in other parts of the city, and 
he mentions, for example, that vandalism has been more of a problem in 
Lindängen than elsewhere.  
 As such, even though he distances himself from some descriptions of 
the situation in Lindängen and the Million Homes Programme at large, he 
does seem to agree with the most basic notion of the matter at hand, namely 
that Lindängen needs to be physically regenerated (as Trianon in fact are 
renovating their buildings); that there are social issues that could be 
addressed through this renovation (as Trianon are, as will be shown later, 
applying certain social measures in their management in Lindängen); and 
that there are certain environmental issues, however mostly expressed as 
energy efficiency issues (as some of the renovation measures Trianon are 
conducting are aimed at becoming more energy efficient). This common 
understanding of the deterioration storyline suggests a shared discursive 
affinity. 
 
Costs and extensiveness  
A substantial part of the deterioration storyline regards the extensiveness 
and costs of the ‘needed’ renovations. For example, the number of 
dwellings that are in need of renovation, the extensiveness of renovation 
that is needed, and, ultimately the price of these renovations, is very much 
unclear and open for debate. These factors can be argued for differently 
depending on estimations of the current state of the buildings and the 
desired renovation outcome standard. However, in order to achieve 
discursive closure, the discourse-coalition must reduce the complexity of the 
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issue, for ‘story-lines lines have the functional role of facilitating the 
reduction of the discursive complexity of a problem and creating 
possibilities for problem closure’ (Hajer, 1995, p. 63). Therefore, as the 
issue needs to be temporarily fixed, certain estimations need to be made and 
conveyed. In doing so, different estimations of the cost of renovation have 
been presented by the Regeneration Dialogue. In a PowerPoint presentation 
for the Regeneration Dialogue, cost estimations are given based on 
examples of previous renovation efforts of Million Homes Programme 
areas. The volume of investment in these examples ranges from 250 000 to 
1 million SEK per apartment (Malmö municipality, 2013b). In a scientific 
report commissioned by Malmö municipality and the landlords in 
Lindängen, Gunnar Blomé performs an economic analysis of possible 
housing renovation measures in Lindängen. He draws up five different 
scenarios ranging from no measures carried out to full-scale renovation or 
demolition and the production of new housing. The analysis concludes that 
a volume of investment ranging from 200 000 to 350 000 SEK per 
apartment is realistic; investments exceeding that would most likely result in 
significant rent increases. This excludes the latter two scenarios, full-scale 
renovation or demolition and the production of new housing, as desirable 
(Blomé, 2013, p. 3).  
 Trianon can be said to have created an own model for basic renovation 
of their buildings in Lindängen (Interview C, 2014). This renovation is 
separated in to two distinct procedures, one that deals with the renovation of 
the exterior of the buildings and their surroundings, and one that deals with 
interior renovation of the apartments. Exterior renovation efforts include: 
renovated laundry rooms, new elevators, new windows, re-roofing, new 
motion-activated exterior lighting, electronic tag-keys for all shared spaces, 
and new heat pumps that enables individually priced heat consumption. 
These efforts apply to all buildings. The costs for this renovation is 
accounted for by Trianon themselves and will not be levied by the tenants, 
and, as such, will not result in rent increases. Trianon believes that these 
investments does not necessarily require long-term ownership in order to 
pay off as the investments are believed to be returned through increased 
property values.  
 The other procedure that deals with interior renovation of the 
apartments includes efforts such as: refurbished hardwood floors in the 
living rooms and bedrooms and new linoleum carpets elsewhere, repainted 
walls and kitchen cabinets, new and fully-tiled bathrooms (a renovation 
made when tenants move out) and new security doors. The costs for this 
interior renovation is approximately 100 000 to 120 000 SEK per apartment. 
This will result in a fixed rent increase of 600 SEK per apartment and 
month, regardless of apartment size. Some of these efforts are made to 
intentionally keep down final rental prices. For example, as new hardwood 
floors are considered an increase in apartment standard and new linoleum 
carpets are not, the latter was chosen to keep rental increases as minimal as 
possible.    
 As expressed by the CEO of Trianon, this strategy is not based on 
benevolence and a concern for current tenants’ welfare, but rather on the 
understanding that too expensive apartments in fringe Million Homes 
Porgramme neighbourhoods in Malmö, such as Lindängen, are hard to rent 
out. In other words, landlords’ intentions with the extent of renovation vary 
 45	  
depending on the economic capacity of potential tenants. This equation is 
very much dependent on local housing market dynamics.  
 For example, as mentioned in section 3.3, in Drakenberg, Stockholm, 
and Kvarngärdet, Uppsala, respectively relatively central Million Homes 
Programme neighbourhoods, there have been instances of extensive 
renovations that have resulted in soaring rent increases upward 50-60 per 
cent (Westin, 2011, p. 11). This has been possible, although protested 
against, because the local housing market has allowed for such ‘traumatic’ 
measures. But in in Lindängen, too rampant rent increases might lead to 
difficulties for the Landlord to lease out the apartments (Interview C, 2014).  
 In other words, the rent gap, which Neil Smith describes as ‘the 
disparity between the potential ground rent level and the actual ground rent 
capitalized under the present land use’ (Smith, 1979, p. 545), is possibly 
wider in Drakenberg and Kvarngärdet than in Lindängen. For as Eric Clark 
argues, ‘[i]n cases where the potential land rent is to be had through housing 
attractive to households with strong purchase-power, it may be seen that this 
process is fundamental to gentrification’ (Clark, 1988, p. 244). Arguably, 
relatively centrally located residential neighborhoods in Stockholm and 
Uppsala are more subjected to the possibility for gentrification or 
‘renoviction’ because of wider rent gaps. Or as Baeten and Listerborn puts 
it, ‘[r]enovation in combination with forced migration is and will be 
occurring more in high-growth regions (particularly Stockholm) where 
landlords will find new tenants who are prepared to pay (sharply) increased 
rents’ (Forthcoming, p. 12).   
 As has been shown, the volume of investment per apartment, regarding 
the Million Homes Programme at large, can range between 100 000 to  
1 million SEK depending on various factors such as current condition, 
aspired apartment standard outcome and aspired energy efficiency 
measures, geographic location, and, quite crassly, the economic capacity of 
attainable tenants. In the case of Trianon, the relatively low renovation costs 
are set according to the economic capacity of their expected costumers, 
namely current tenants.  
 In other words, the renovation is done in accordance with the present 
(perhaps fairly narrow) rent-gap. It does, however, make sense for the 
Regeneration Dialogue to rhetorically be on ‘the high end of the investment 
spectrum’ to get their message of the magnitude of the issue across and in 
order to suggest that the creation of a investment fund would be a viable and 
necessary solution for the regeneration of Lindängen.    
 In conclusion, the deterioration storyline is driven by the well-anchored 
perception within the discourse-coalition that some Million Homes 
Programme areas are physically deteriorating and that regeneration of them 
is duly needed. Also, social and environmental aspects are often 
interconnected with this deterioration. Indeed, the ‘integration’ of the needs 
for ‘environmental regeneration’ and ‘social regeneration’ is what renders 
the Regeneration Dialogue plausible. Although defined by different actor 
with different motives and goals, the deterioration storyline is here seen as a 
fairly coherent storyline. The extensiveness and cost of the ‘needed’ 
regeneration is, however, less fixed. Overall, the storyline seems credible to 
concerned actors.  
 The storyline is accepted for various reasons. The fact that public actors 
accept it is perhaps to be anticipated, as they are in fact the ones advocating 
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the regeneration. Indeed, the socioeconomic statistics for Lindängen 
presented in section 1.3 is also part of this storyline as it was produced as as 
part the MIL project to ‘manifest’ this ‘deterioration’. The CEO of Trianon 
opposes some elements of this construction. Nevertheless, he (partly) 
accepts it (and the position it ascribes Trianon).  
 Since the deterioration storyline seem to have the rhetorical power to 
conceptualise the actors’ understanding of Million Homes Programme areas 
(and their European counterparts) as ‘problematic’, and because this 
conception has led to the development of the Regeneration Dialogue, the 
storyline has translated into institutional arrangements. This suggests that 
the storyline is hegemonic. It is, however, important to point out that this 
storyline has only been discerned as hegemonic in a domain of planning 
practice (in the widest sense) in Malmö. Where the domain instead, for 
example, planning academia, this discerned level of dominance might not at 
all be valid.  
 Whereas the presented deterioration storyline defines the ‘problem’, the 
following two storylines are more solution and implementation-oriented and 
thus ‘follows up’ on this problem definition. 
 
6.4 The Social Mobilisation Storyline 
The argumentative ‘core’ of the social mobilisation storyline is that the 
suggested extensive (physical) regeneration would be possible only if 
coupled with a social mobilisation process. This regeneration would not 
only have positive environmental effects, but it would also have positive 
effects for the residents’ social circumstances. Thus, making it a ‘social’ 
investment. As it is deployed in in the case of regeneration of Lindängen, 
the plausibility of the social investment discourse is dependent on the 
premises that better physical environments lead to better social life, and that 
the regeneration itself needs to create a ‘sufficient’ amount of jobs to alter 
the social circumstances of ‘enough’ residents to ‘break segregation’ and 
‘social exclusion’. This makes the social mobilisation storyline ‘essential’ 
for the discerned discourse-coalition.   
 However, social mobilisation can mean different things to different 
actors. Yet still it is uttered as a coherent discursive fixity. As such it fun-
ctions as a storyline, around which various actors from different discourses 
form a coalition wherein ‘social mobilisation’ evokes a shared narrative – 
albeit each actor ascribes it different meaning.      
 For the Employment Agency, social mobilisation can mean job creation 
and an active labour market policy – a way to take people out of unemploy-
ment; for the urban planner, it can be a justification for interventions in the 
urban environment; for the macroeconomist, it can mean more production 
value and less social expenditure; for the sociologist, it can mean social and 
system integration; and for the private landlord, it can be a corporate stra-
tegy that produces more monetary and good-will value than business as 
usual. For each of these actors, social mobilisation means different things. 
Even so, they can all argue for its cause, not necessarily knowing the com-
plexity of all other actors’ arguments for it, yet knowing enough to share the 
same affinity for it. This is what Hajer (2005, p. 304) calls discursive 
affinity.  
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In their report on Lindängen, macroeconomists Nilsson and Wadeskog 
expresses the ‘core’ of the social mobilisation storyline  
 
One of the basic ideas in this report is that societal exclusion is 
expensive, very expensive. We have also shown this in a number of 
sample calculations. It is then natural to see a social mobilisation 
process, not only as a good human and social contribution, but also as 
a wise investment. A social investment at the individual level enhances 
human capital, and, at the collective level, social capital (Nilsson & 
Wadeskog, p 38). 
 
The social mobilisation storyline is articulated by drawing on a social 
justice discourse, as the proposed action (‘social mobilisation’) would 
suggest an act of benevolence. This is then, by drawing on a social 
investment discourse, related to the idea that the investment would be an 
investment made in ‘people’. But what really makes the storyline credible is 
that it draws on a macroeconomic discourse – as the calculations have 
shown that this is a ‘wise’ investment. This can be seen as the alignment of 
‘economic ‘and ‘social’ discourses that Grander argued for in chapter 4. 
Also, the utterance above shows a particular understanding of the social 
investment discourse. Here ‘social mobilisation’, which more or less can be 
equated with local job creation (discussed later in this section), is explained 
as the actual investment, an investment that ‘at the individual level enhances 
human capital, and, at the collective level, social capital’. This suggests an 
understanding of human and social capital as being ‘created’ through 
employment. As such, it presupposes that any job is a good job, 
disregarding the quality of that job in terms of security, duration, etc. This 
resonates with the ‘strand’ of the social investment discourse related to the 
more ‘activation’-oriented policies of the so-called Third way, as opposed to 
the more ‘contemporary’ definitions that implies a stronger focus on quality 
of the social investments (as presented in chapter 4).  
This can be seen as indicative of the ‘fluidity’ of meaning within a 
discourse.  
 Further in the same report, when calculating different scenarios for 
when break-even will occur, they contend that  
 
If we succeed with a total of 54 people (roughly 7 % of the 
unemployed in Lindängen) in the social mobilisation process, after 30 
years this is equivalent of the cost for half the housing renovation in 
Lindängen. If break-even is to be reached in 15 years, it takes around 
85 people (Nilsson & Wadeskog, 2013, p. 42).  
 
Language like ‘break-even’ clearly draws on a macroeconomic discourse, 
giving the social investment claim particular ‘factuality’. Also, the ‘Third 
way’ meaning of social investments is again articulated, where a certain 
quantity of jobs determine the successfulness of the investment. Also, the 
term social mobilisation, as opposed to local job creation, is used. This term 
is also used repeatedly elsewhere, not just by Nilsson and Wadeskog, but by 
several other actors connected to the discourse-coalition as well (Interview 
A, 2014; Malmö municipality, 2013a; Stenquist, 2013). This slightly 
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ambiguous term suggest a sort of ‘more-than-just-plain-jobs’ rhetoric. 
Social mobilisation, more so than local job creation, has a certain ‘figure of 
speech’-like character in that it is used as shorthand in discussions assuming 
that others understand the meaning of the term. It very much functions as a 
metaphor for local job creation as it is used instead of it to describe the 
creation of jobs. However, it is also used to denote something ’more’, 
something ‘larger’ at play than ‘simply’ the creation of jobs. Social 
mobilisation, as it is used in Nilsson and Wadeskog’s rapport for 
Lindängen, is the overall process by which the ‘costs of exclusion’ are 
reduced to a break-even.  
 This illustrates the emblematic character of social mobilisation, but it 
also shows the contingency of the term and the ‘fluidity’ in discursive 
meaning. This more-than-just-plain-jobs’ rhetoric is also expressed in a 
slide-presentation for the Regeneration Dialogue, presented as figure 3 
below.   
 
 
Fig. 3. Illustration from a slide-presentation for the Regeneration Dialogue. Source: 
Malmö municipality, 2013c 
 
Figure 3 suggests the prospective magnitude of the regeneration in 
Lindängen. What is here expressed can be said to draw on the social 
investment discourse as this intervention – this ‘social investment’ – can 
potentially create this thriving ‘new’ neighbourhood, with ‘pre-emptive’ 
social investment elements like ‘nursery care’ and ‘school’ (both of which 
already exists today). If the same illustration would be used in a context 
where social investments were not propagated, it could still easily fly as 
your ‘generic’, advocated for positive effects of neighbourhood regen-
eration.  
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Below, the Project manager for the Regeneration Dialogue discursively 
reproduces Nilsson and Wadeskog’s macroeconomic-informed arguments 
 
 This balance sheet needs to include the investment needed to 
“future proof” 1,700 apartments with 4,000 inhabitants and direct 
and indirect costs for social exclusion in Lindängen. Preliminary 
figures suggest a pent up investment need of €120 million (of which 
half is directed towards energy savings) while costs for social 
exclusion accumulated over four years runs at €140 million. These 
numbers can then be used to find a “break-even” where a certain 
level of job creation and social mobilisation results in measurable 
savings in public systems, as well as in energy and maintenance 
costs. Savings that, through a social impact investment approach, 
can be used to put the necessary investments in these neglected areas 
in place (Stenquist, 2013, p. 76).  
 
The ‘costs of exclusion’ rhetoric and the macroeconomic discourse is 
reproduced as local job creation and social mobilisation is expressed as the 
solution to both the pent up investment need and to social exclusion in 
Lindängen. As such, local job creation and social mobilisation is what will 
enable social investments in Lindängen, i.e. the funds that eventually would 
be released for regeneration is guaranteed only if a certain level of jobs are 
created. This makes job creation and social mobilisation key elements of the 
social investment discourse.  
 Even for someone with a lay understanding of economics, this equation 
of costs for pent up maintenance and cost for social exclusion on the one 
hand, and ‘a certain level of job creation and social mobilisation’ on the 
other, seems readily comprehensible. This shows a major strength of the 
social investment discourse, namely that its arguments are truly difficult to 
counter intellectually. Another important aspect with the reasoning for 
social investments as it is presented above – where investment need and 
social expenditure is set against job creation – is that it is coherent and 
factual. Not only is the social investment discourse factual and intellectually 
coherent, it is also seemingly apolitically constituted. It is hard, from an 
ideological standpoint, to argue against it – it is just a matter of ‘crunching 
numbers’ (i.e. calculating the ‘costs of exclusion’). This can to some extent 
elucidate its increasing structuration in public policy formulation, as with 
the case of the Malmö Commission. It seemingly holds political bloc 
affiliations aside, which might facilitate its implementation over office 
terms. What could pose problems, however, are the prevalent institutional 
arrangements constraining the implementation of such ‘factual’ ‘number 
crunching’ strategies. For, as mentioned in chapter 4, it would take drastic 
changes of such institutional arrangements and of the economic hegemony 
to successfully enact deep-rooted social investment polices.  
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Below, Municipal commissioner for labour market affairs expresses his 
understanding of ‘job creation’ 
 
So far there has been no economic equation for how to make this 
[Million Homes Programme regeneration] profitable […] those 
equations that exist, they point to a will to build new [housing]. And 
that’s what’s exciting about the Regeneration dialogue, that we can 
solve all those problems in one stroke. By renovating and 
regenerating these Million Homes Programme areas, partly by 
creating jobs in the process and thereby get people to stay, partly by 
building new [housing], and to build new in a new way, where you 
also employ more people living in the neighbourhood. So what’s 
exciting is that we can gain all these benefits: both economic 
sustainability, that is, the economy is there; environmental 
sustainability, in the sense that it is about the environment, energy 
efficiency; and social sustainability, in the sense that it actually 
creates jobs. So that’s what’s exciting, it connects everything 
(Interview B, 2014) 
 
The Regeneration Dialogue, and more specifically local jobs created in the 
process, is expressed as ‘exciting’, ‘a new logic’, and a measure that could 
make regeneration of Million Homes Programme areas possible – it can 
‘help solve all problems at once’. Both the renovation of existing housing 
and the possible building of new housing are interlinked with the creation of 
new jobs locally. Also, job creation is equated with social sustainability. 
Here the holistic sustainability discourse is drawn on as a communicative 
tool conceptualising the phenomenon of local job creation. As such, this is 
an occurrence of structuration of the holistic sustainability discourse, as the 
subject draws on ideas or concepts from it in order to render the job creation 
argument plausible.  
 In the same interview, Municipal commissioner continues 
 
I oppose the current public debate that it’s all about jobs, at any cost. 
Because that’s not the case, but that’s my ideological standpoint – 
there are crappy jobs. And when I say crappy jobs I mean jobs that you 
can’t make a living on, or jobs that you probably won’t be able to 
keep. That’s crappy jobs to me. So that’s why it’s important that we 
make demands, the right demands, on the [created jobs], that they 
would mean education and good conditions for individuals to either 
work for that employer for a longer period of time, or, at least, the 
possibility to apply for similar jobs in that profession. And it really 
needs to equip that individual […] and you have to make sure that the 
education people get is of good quality (Interview B, 2014).  
 
Here, the concept of local job creation is itself problematized. This has the 
subject evaluating the measure that is seen as key for societal inclusion (job 
creation) in relation to the quality of that measure, e.g. ‘all jobs are not good 
jobs’. This together with utterances such as ‘equip the individual’ and ‘good 
quality education’ relates to the need for human capital enhancement as 
argued for by social investment proponents (in chapter 4). As such, he 
expresses affinity for the social mobilisation storyline at the same time as he 
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expresses a certain scepticism regarding what the created jobs would 
actually entail in terms of quality. Even so the storyline is plausible to him, 
making him accept the position within the discourse-coalition that the 
storyline ascribes for him.     
 Trianon is the landlord in Lindängen that has come the farthest as far as 
embracing social mobilisation strategies are concerned (Interview A, 2014). 
The CEO of Trianon (Interview C, 2014) describes how they have signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding with Malmö municipality that they 
themselves call a ‘mini-Regeneration Dialogue’. In accordance with the 
Memorandum of Understanding, they have employed ten people in the 
renovation process, out of which five are local residents. Another eight 
employments are pending and yet another five are planned. Also, as 
designed on their own accord, any suppliers that wish to engage in business 
with Trianon must agree to certain social terms stipulated in the contract. 
This entails that the supplier in question must employ a certain amount of 
unemployed residents to get the contract. For example, the construction 
company Skanska have signed a contract to replace all the windows in 
Trianon’s buildings in Lindängen, and stipulated in that contract is that 
Skanska must employ five unemployed residents for that specific job. This 
means that these residents will gain project employments designed for that 
particular job only. He describes the measures the company has taken as 
having positive neighbourhood effects that has the potential for 
strengthening the social capital, which, in turn, could reduce maintenance 
costs in the long run. As a result, he mentions that vandalism has decreased 
in the neighbourhood. He also describes the measures as something they 
believe in, as if acting on a hunch more than on evidence, and as an act of 
good-will. He explains that the Regeneration Dialogue has provided a 
rationale appealing to him as a landlord, in that it has ‘opened his eyes’ for 
the benefits of this type of ‘value-based’ real estate management. To him, 
the social mobilisation storyline renders the discourse-coalition credible, as 
he ‘permits’ the position within the discursive structure the storyline implies 
for Trianon, i.e the ‘responsible landlord’. This position is also accepted 
because it is attractive, both because it entails economic gains as a result of 
lesser maintenance costs and decreased vandalism, but also because it 
entails a certain good-will façade, rendering him a sort of ‘problem solver’ 
in the discourse-coalition. To him, social mobilisation might mean less 
vandalism, more economic gains, good-will appearance, and an overall 
better neighbourhood. For the municipality it might mean a possibility to 
meet the City’s energy efficiency goals, or a means to create better living 
environments for residents and a lesser burden for the public economy. 
Even so, both actors can agree with each other’s arguments, as it does not 
contradict the core argument that social mobilisation in neighbourhood 
regeneration is desirable. Both actors share discursive affinity. 
 Another actor on the very ‘fringe’ of the discourse-coalition is the 
Swedish Property Federation. The Swedish Property Federation is a national 
property owners’ trade organisation that lobbies for property owners’ 
interests. In a telephone interview, the head of commercial policy for the 
southern regional subsidiary of the Swedish Property Federation says that 
they are sympathetic with landlords engaging in local job creation measures 
and ‘value-based’ management and that they are happy to highlight such 
efforts. Their stance as a trade organisation is, however, limited to them 
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‘applauding it from the stands’ (Interview D, 2014). This expresses a distant 
affinity for the discourse-coalition. Still, as a representative for Landlords, 
he accepts this position as it attributes a certain ‘responsible behaviour’ to 
the profession he represents.  
 Below, the project manager for MIL describes the MIL project’s 
‘informing’ role 
 
We work a lot with, partly with informing all different actors, anyone 
from the Social Insurance Agency to the landlord, about how these 
connections are interrelated, how the costs for vandalism and graffiti, 
how this affects the landlord and the value of their property, and so on. 
That is the so-called physical cost; we work close with the landlord on 
that issue (Interview A, 2014). 
 
Trianon’s aligning to the storyline can be seen as the reproduction of the 
social investment discourse and the arguments of ‘costs of exclusion’ 
articulated in the excerpt above. This utterance, in turn, can be seen as the 
reproduction of the Malmö Commission’s argument for social investment 
polices and as the reproduction of Nilsson and Wadeskog’s more ‘tangible’ 
conception of ‘costs of exclusion’. This suggests that the argument for 
social mobilisation as a solution for successful neighbourhood regeneration 
has ‘gone full-circle’, although somewhat transformed along the way.  
 As shown in chapter 4, ‘contemporary’ proponents of the social 
investment perspective argues for a profound restructuring of the modern 
welfare state – entailing that to merely create ‘any jobs’ possible is not 
sufficient. Attention most also be given to the quality of the created jobs, 
such as duration, security, advancement possibilities, etc. The social 
mobilisation ‘solution’ advocated by the Regeneration Dialogue, and the 
actual jobs being created by Trianon, seem, on the other hand, less 
connected to such notions of ‘quality’. This aspect is somewhat articulated 
by the Municipal commissioner, as he argued for the importance of ‘quality’ 
rather than ‘quantity’. Even so, he shares discursive affinity for the social 
mobilisation storyline.  
 In conclusion, the rhetoric of the social mobilisation storyline seem to 
have affected how actor’s within the discourse-coalition perceive social 
mobilisation (or local job creation), namely as a solution for, or an 
important ingredient of, successful neighbourhood regeneration. It also 
seem to have translated into institutional arrangements, such as the 
development of the Regeneration Dialogue itself propagating for social 
mobilisation, and the fact that jobs are created locally (or at least, people are 
recruited locally). Therefore, the social mobilisation storyline is here seen 
as hegemonic in the domain of planning practice for ‘disadvantaged’ 
neighbourhoods in Malmö, a domain that seemingly offers no counter-
hegemonic arguments against social mobilisation. However, the concerns 
for ‘quality’ express some intra-discursive incoherence.   
 Also, something that is not brought up in this study but worthy of 
mentioning is the so-called Area Programme. In short, the Area-programme 
is an area-based project targeting five neighbourhoods in Malmö, Lindängen 
being one. The project spans from 2010 to 2015 and revolves around the 
notion of interconnecting physical interventions with social aspects (Malmö 
Municipality, 2014c). Unlike the Regeneration Dialogue, it does not 
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explicitly propagate social investments. Perhaps the Area programme could 
offer discursive struggle regarding how ‘to do’ targeted area-based 
interventions in disadvantaged neighbourhoods. As such, it could pose as 
counter-hegemonic, representing the ‘old’ non-social investment-informed 
practice.  
 
6.5 The Investment Fund Storyline 
As will be shown, the investment fund storyline is ‘floating in significance’ 
within the discourse-coalition, yet very important for the Regeneration 
Dialogue. This storyline is basically the advocacy for a social investment 
fund, which more or less ‘makes or brakes’ the suggested regeneration. 
Whereas the social mobilisation storyline presents a solution to reduce the 
‘costs of exclusion’ and ‘turn’ the neighbourhood around socioeconom-
ically, the development of an investment fund is expressed as a precondition 
to regenerate Lindängen to the extent that is suggested.  
 Below, the project manager for MIL explains why an investment fund is 
needed 
 
We have at the moment different development scenarios. One 
development scenario is that they, the private landlords, will do 
nothing. In other word, they will slum-manage the apartments […] The 
second scenario is that we have landlords that invests, that fixes a little 
here and a little there –‘now we need to make this more energy 
efficient’, or –’we need to replace the windows’. They do a little at the 
time. The problem is that this constraints them from doing these really 
comprehensive energy efficiency measures that actually needs to be 
done in order to meet the [City’s energy efficiency] demands in 20-30 
years. The third scenario, which has happened in other parts of 
Sweden, is that they do everything, they do everything that we want 
them to do […] but then we get the rent increases, and then you force 
people out. What we want is really the fourth scenario. That is the one 
we are looking for (Interview A, 2014) 
 
What this investment fund – this ‘fourth scenario’ – would look like is still 
unclear. It would however involve the development of a fund for ‘social and 
environmental purposes’, and the ‘public’ (the municipality, the state, 
and/or the EU) would have to make the ‘investment’. Then both public and 
private actors could use this fund for various ‘social and environmental 
purposes’ related to the regeneration, such as employing local residents to 
do ‘environmental conducive’ renovations.    
 What is made clear though in the excerpt above is the exclusion of other 
discourses, or ‘scenarios’. To eliminate slumlords as a possible alternative 
might not seem remarkable. That fact that the third scenario, where 
landlords do the suggested renovations only they increase rents and 
potentially displace people, is expressed as an undesirable option can be 
seen as a social justice discursive argument pitted against ‘market forces’. 
Why the second scenario, where landlords maintain their housing stock on a 
rudimentary level, is seen as undesirable is clearly expressed, as ‘this 
constraints them from doing these really comprehensive energy efficiency 
measures that actually needs to be done in order to meet the [City’s energy 
efficiency] demands in 20-30 years’. This is an argument that particularly 
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draws on the sustainability discourse. So far, neither the social justice nor 
the social investment discourse contributes to the argumentation.  
 However, this changes when ‘integrative’ or ‘holistic’ aspects are 
introduced 
 
Another important aspect of the Regeneration Dialogue is put the work 
with environmental sustainability in Million Homes programme areas 
in tune with, and as a tool to reach, social and economic sustainability. 
Environmental regeneration of estates strengthens the work with both 
environmental and integration issues (Malmö municipality, 2013a, p. 
6).    
 
As ‘environmental sustainability’ becomes a catalyst for ‘social and 
economic sustainability’, and as environmental regeneration strengthens the 
work with integration, the need to meet the City’s environmental goals (a 
sustainability discourse argument) becomes a tool for achieving social 
sustainability and integration (a social justice and social investment 
discourse argument). So now, arguments for an investment fund comprise 
arguments from the sustainability, social justice, and social investment 
discourses.  
 The investment fund storyline excludes the alternative scenarios as 
either doing ‘too little’ or ‘too much’. The fourth scenario – the investment 
fund – is not only expressed as the ‘the middle-way’ but also as creating 
new synergetic effects. The investment fund storyline thus constructs a 
‘reality’ in which only an extensive regeneration effort is an adequate 
solution, as the other options are deemed unattractive. As such, this ‘regime 
of truth’ excludes the other discourses in a ‘hegemonic practice’. However, 
this hegemony is only viable in certain practices and to certain actors, 
namely to the actors propagating it and the practices through which they 
propagate.  
 The CEO of Trianon (Interview C, 2014) expresses intra-discourse-
coalition incoherence as he adheres to the ‘second scenario’ discourse. He 
explains that he is critical of the conception that the problem at large, that is 
the physical deterioration of some Million Homes Programme areas and the 
renovation of them, is a ‘political’ issue. On the contrary, he explains it as 
solely a landlord issue. Therefore, he is critical of the suggested investment 
fund, saying that this ‘subsidising’ of renovation efforts in Million Homes 
Programme areas might contribute to landlords systematically neglecting 
their housing stock, ‘expecting’ state funding to pay for renovation and 
maintenance. And, therefore, he fears that such subsidies would favour 
disreputable landlords.  
 The municipal commissioner also fragmentises the storyline by asking  
 
Is it really fair that landlords for several years fail to maintain or 
renovate? I’m not saying that’s the case [in Lindängen], but generally 
speaking, if we take this model elsewhere. Is it fair that a landlord who 
fails to maintain his building for several years, and the ‘turns to some 
fund’ and asks society to bail them out? Because that’s how it can be 
interpreted. So it’s a fine balancing act. Everyone can se the benefits, 
but there are huge risks involved, huge risks (Interview B, 2014)  
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The investment fund storyline seemingly has the ‘traits’ of a storyline; it is a 
rather ambiguous metaphor, and a ‘condensed statement summarizing 
complex narratives, used by people as “short hand” in discussions’ (2005, p. 
302). However, it is a storyline of ‘floating significance’ fragmenting the 
discourse-coalition rather than a storyline that reduces discursive 
complexity and help to achieve discursive closure. Therefore, it is a non-
storyline struggling to achieve the ‘cementing’ features of a ‘real’ storyline. 
Thus, through this analysis, the investment fund argument is invalidated as a 
storyline.   
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7. Concluding Remarks and Reflections 
 
 
In chapter 3, gentrification and renoviction’ is presented as processes that 
potentially could lead to negative outcomes for existing tenants by inducing 
rent increases, or at worst displacement. This answers my supporting 
question: What negative social outcomes for existing tenants could 
potentially be induced by neighbourhood regeneration?  
  In chapter 4, the social investment perspective is presented as a 
discourse characterized by a pre-emptive rather than remedial understanding 
of social policy with elements of both Keynesian and neoliberal economics. 
This discourse is rather fluid in meaning as it can entail everything from a 
radical restructuring of the welfare state to ‘one-dimensional’ notions of job 
creation.  
 In chapter 5, three discourses were discerned as prominent in the 
Malmö Commission’s work: a social investment discourse, a sustainability 
discourse, and a social justice discourse. The social investment discourse is 
formulated as a counter-discourse to the prevalent neoliberal ‘growth-first’ 
hegemony and has both rhetorically and substantially influenced social 
policy in Malmö. The development of the Regeneration is an example of 
that. Arguments from both a social justice discourse and a sustainability 
discourse aid the reproduction of the social investment discourse, rendering 
it plausible. Also, certain economical aspects of the social investment 
discourse seem to have influenced a reformulation of the sustainability 
discourse. This answers my supporting question: What is the Social 
Investment Perspective and can it be discerned in the works of the Malmö 
Commission and in the regeneration of Lindängen? 
 In chapter 6, a discourse-coalition united by a common understanding 
concerning the regeneration of Lindängen was discerned. This discourse-
coalition is made coherent by three storyline: the deterioration storyline, the 
social mobilisation storyline, and the investment fund storyline.  
 The deterioration storyline is problem-defining as it presents Lindängen 
and other high-rise housing estates throughout Europe as problematic. Most 
actors permit this description and accept the position it ascribes for them in 
the discourse-coalition. This storyline explains the ‘current situation’ from 
which actors can ‘act’ certain ways. Much like Hajer’s acid rain storyline 
functioned as metaphor to make sense of dead trees, so does the physical 
deterioration of buildings function as a metaphor to make sense of the social 
problematic of Lindängen and similar ‘disadvantaged’ neighbourhoods. By 
drawing on a social justice discourse and a sustainability discourse, public 
actors propagating the regeneration represent themselves as ‘responsible’ 
for addressing this ‘deterioration’. At the same time as the deterioration 
storyline defines a problem it also presents a ‘need’. This ‘need’ is also 
expressed as urgent. This, in turn, justifies the suggested regeneration of 
Lindängen. 
 The social mobilisation storyline is solution-oriented as it presents local 
job creation as a means to improve the socioeconomic conditions of the 
neighbourhood by taking resident from ‘exclusion’ to employment. This 
argumentation is particularly informed by a macroeconomic discourse 
expressing the ‘social problematic’ in terms of ‘costs of exclusion’. It 
thereby presents a ‘solution’ to the situation described through the deterior-
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ation storyline. Most actors permit to this storyline because its arguments 
seem plausible and attractive. For example, the ‘act’ of employing local 
residents can for Trianon both be financially profitable at the same time as 
they are ascribed a certain ‘responsible behaviour’, rendering Trianon’s 
position in the discourse-coalition acceptable and attractive.  
 The investment fund storyline, like the social mobilisation storyline, 
also present a ‘solution’ to the situation defined by the deterioration 
storyline. This ‘solution’ is the development of a social and environmental 
investment fund. However, the argument for such a fund is contested. On 
the account of potential political implications, all actors do not accept the 
storyline. Therefore, as the investment fund argument fragmentises the 
discourse-coalition rather than help to achieve discursive closure, it is 
invalidated as a storyline.  
 By drawing on the social mobilisation storyline and by arguing for the 
development of an investment fund, the Regeneration Dialogue contends 
that by implementing such ‘social investment’ strategies, an extensive 
regeneration of Lindängen is possible without inducing negative social 
outcomes, such as rampant rent increases and displacement. This answers 
my central research question: Can the implementation of social investment 
strategies in the regeneration of Lindängen help deflect renewal-induced 
negative social outcomes for existing tenants? 
 
Reflections regarding the subject of study 
One aspect that has been apparent to me is the difficulty of transferring 
polices from the abstract ideopolitical plane – where social investments are 
defined as long-term investments in human capital made to ‘prepare’ 
individuals for the conditions of the knowledge-based economy – to 
concrete actions, such as the Regeneration Dialogue. Because the social 
investment perspective is a ‘package-deal’ it is also easily fragmentised and 
circumscribed. For example, whereas the notion of the quality of jobs rather 
than the creation of any jobs is pivotal for social investment advocates, the 
focus of the Regeneration Dialogue seems rather narrowly directed towards 
‘creating jobs’, notwithstanding the quality of those jobs in terms of job 
security, duration, education, or vocational advancement. As such, the 
propagated social mobilisation resembles a job activation strategy 
reminiscent of ‘Third way’ policies, aiming to create ‘any jobs’ possible. 
This renders the social investment ambitions somewhat flat.  
 An issue related to this is whether the regeneration itself actually creates 
new jobs. Perhaps social terms stipulating to employ local residents only 
creates a situation where residents are employed ‘instead’ of someone else. 
Then what value does this local recruitment add? Is it thus perhaps a 
question of affirmative action based on residency, and, if so, how is the 
value of such efforts evaluated?   
 Another aspect that has become apparent is the potential political 
implications of the suggested investment fund. As the development of such 
a fund entails a merging of public and private funds, this raises both ethical 
and democratic issues. However you turn it, it is a case of the public 
‘lending’ money to private enterprise, whether the ‘public’ is the 
municipality, the state, or the European Union.  
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One obvious problem is the ‘enabling’ of mismanaging landlords to 
postpone renovation needs, hoping to enjoy the fruits of public ‘subsidies’, 
so to speak. For this, rigorous preventions measures must be considered. 
Some possibilities might include keeping track-records of landlords’ 
previous ‘behaviour’, stipulating certain durations of owning and managing, 
ensuring a certain level of security in terms of quality of the employments, 
etc. Apart from this, surely there are other issues of accountability and 
responsibility concerning such transactions. Indeed, such uncertainties 
warrants the question whether this is actually the ‘way to go’, in terms of 
how to renovate the Million Homes Programme stock.  
 Even so, perhaps the social investment fund should be seen as a 
response to Nylund’s (2014, p. 18) assertion that ‘it is strange that there is 
no serious discussion of redistribution [in the Malmö Commission’s final 
report], though reallocating resources from one district to another would 
seem to be a precondition for bridging the present implementation gap 
between great visions and poor results in practice’. Maybe the suggested 
investment fund could be a new form of ‘innovative’ welfare redistribution 
potentially capable bridging this implementation gap?   
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Appendix: Translated Excerpts  
 
 
Page 33, The Malmö Commission… Malmökommissionen [förespråkar] ett 
socialt investeringsperspektiv. Det handlar i stora drag om att se sociala 
insatser och satsningar som investeringar, inte som kostnader. Investeringar 
i människor, särskilt under barndomen, ger vinster på längre sikt. Det visar 
sig bland annat genom att fler klarar skolan, utbildar sig, arbetar och kan 
försörja sig och har en god hälsa. Färre hamnar i långvarigt, både socialt och 
ekonomiskt kostsamt, utanförskap. Utifrån ett socialt investeringsperspektiv 
är det också viktigt att stärka sambandet mellan tillväxt och en jämlik 
välfärd, förbättra kvaliteten på jobben och framhålla trygghet som ett värde i 
sig. (Stigendal & Östergren, 2013, pp. i-ii) 
 
Page 34, One obstacle to... Ett hinder för att tänka i termer av sociala 
investeringar är att de nuvarande styrsystemen för kommunen reflekterar en 
världsbild med ekonomisk tillväxt i centrum och ekonomisk hållbarhet som 
den enda intressanta aspekten. Det ger inte utrymme för tanken om sociala 
investeringar. Eftersom ekonomisk tillväxt sätts i högsätet så definieras alla 
utgifter i den sociala sfären, till exempel skola vård och omsorg, som 
kostnader vilka “avleder” resurser från ekonomisk tillväxt (Stigendal & 
Östergren, 2013, pp. 49-50).  
 
Page 36, We need measures… Vi måste ha mått på alla tre aspekterna för att 
kunna bedöma att utvecklingen verkligen är hållbar. Ledande ekonomer har 
redan föreslagit sådana paneler av utvecklingsmått. Av detta följer att det 
inte räcker med renodlat ekonomiska investeringar. Det krävs även 
ekologiska och sociala investeringar, det vill säga sådana som gynnar en 
ekologisk såväl som social hållbarhet. Malmö har blivit internationellt prisat 
för sina ekologiska investeringar, men samma tänkande har inte utvecklats 
då det gäller den sociala hållbarheten (Stigendal & Östergren, 2013, p. 49). 
 
Page 47, One of the basic… En av grundtankarna i denna rapport är att 
utanförskapet i samhället är dyrt, mycket dyrt. Detta har vi också visat i ett 
antal räkneexempel. Det ligger då nära till hands att se en social mobili-
seringsprocess inte bara som en god mänsklig och social insats utan också 
som en klok investering. En social investering som på individnivå stärker 
humankapitalet och på kollektiv nivå det sociala kapitalet (Nilsson & 
Wadeskog, p. 38). 
 
Page 47, If we succeed… Vi ser då att om vi lyckas med totalt 54 personer 
(ungefär 7 % av de arbetslösa i Lindängen) i den sociala mobiliserings-pro-
cessen så motsvarar detta efter 30 år kostnaderna för halva fastighets-
renoveringen i Lindängen. Om break even-målet ska uppnås på 15 år, krävs 
det ungefär 85 personer (Nilsson & Wadeskog, 2013, p. 42).  
 
Page 50, So far there has… hittills har det inte funnits någon ekonomisk 
ekvation för att det ska löna sig […] Utan de ekvationer som finns dom 
visar på vilja att bygga nytt. Och det spännande med Bygga om-dialogen är 
just där, kan vi lösa alla de problemen, i ett slag liksom. Genom att renovera 
och rusta upp de här miljonprogramsområdena, dels genom att vara jobb-
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skapande i den processen, och därmed få människor till att stanna kvar. Och 
dels genom att kanske bygga nytt, och bygga nytt på nytt sätt, där man 
också sysselsätter alltfler som bor i bostadsområdet. Så det spännande med 
är ju: kan vi uppnå alla de här vinsterna, både då ekonomiskt hållbart, det 
vill säga ekonomin går ihop, ekologiskt hållbart, i det perspektivet att det 
handlar om miljö, energieffektiviseringar, och socialt hållbart, genom att det 
faktiskt skapar jobb. Så det är ju det som är det spännande att det går på 
tvären genom allt (Interview B, 2014).  
 
Page 50, I oppose the current… jag vänder ju mig mot också mot den 
samhällsdebatt vi har idag, där det handlar om jobb till vilket pris som helst. 
För så är det ju inte, men det är ju liksom min ideologiska uppfattning att: 
nä, det finns skit jobb. Och när jag säger att det finns skitjobb så menar jag 
jobb som man inte kan leva på, och som man antagligen inte kommer att 
kunna behålla. Det är skitjobb för mig. Så därför är det viktigt att vi ställer 
krav, rätt krav, på det [de skapade jobben] att det kommer innebära 
utbildning och bra förutsättningar för individerna att antigen ha ett jobb 
under en längre tid hos den här arbetsgivaren, eller i varje fall möjlighet att 
kunna ta liknande jobb i nom branschen, i samma arbetsgivare. Och det 
måste verkligen rusta individen […]Och man måste se till att den utbildning 
folk får, att den är kvalitativt bra (Interview B, 2014).  
 
Page 52, we work a lot… vi jobbar väldigt mycket med att, dels med att 
informera alla olika aktörer, allt från försäkringskassan till fastighetsägaren, 
om hur de här sambanden, hur det hänger ihop, hur kostnaderna för 
skadegörelse och klotter, hur det påverkar fastighetsägare och värdet på 
husen och liknande. Det är liksom den fysiska kostnaden, den jobbar vi 
väldigt med tätt med fastighetsägare (Interviewee A, 2014). 
 
Page 53, We have at the…Vi har ett utvecklingsscenario, på de privata 
fastighets-ägarna, där man inte kommer göra någonting. Man kommer alltså 
slumförvalta lägenheterna. […] Det andra scenariot är att vi har fastighets-
ägare som investerar, eller mer lappar och lagar, ’nu behöver vi göra den här 
energieffektiviseringen, eller vi behöver byta fönster’, man gör lite i taget. 
Problemet där blir att man låser in sig, för man gör inte de här riktigt stora 
energieffektiviseringsåtgärderna man faktiskt skulle behöva göra för att 
möta kraven om 20-30 år. Det tredje scenariot vi har, vilket har hänt i andra 
delar av Sverige, är just det här att man gör allt, de gör allt vi vill at dom ska 
göra. […] men då har man ju de hyreshöjningarna, och då tvingar man ju ut 
människor. Så det är egentligen det fjärde scenariot, det är det vi letar efter 
(Interview A, 2014). 
 
Page 54, Another important aspect… En viktig aspekt av Bygga om-
dialogen är dessutom att sätta arbetet med miljömässig hållbarhet i 
miljonprogramsområdena i samklang med, och som ett redskap för att nå, 
social- och ekonomisk hållbarhet. Miljömässig upprustning av fastigheter 
stärker både miljö- och integrationsarbetet (Malmö municipality, 2013a, p. 
6).  
 
 
 68	  
Page 54, Is it really fair… är det verkligen rimligt att fastighetsägare då, i 
flera år underlåter att underhålla eller renovera [sina byggnader]. Nu säger 
jag inte att man gjort så i det här fallet [på Lindängen], men vi kan ta ett 
allmänt fall, om vi tar den här modellen någon annanstans. Är det rimligt att 
en fastighetsägare skiter i och underhålla sitt hus i flera år, och sedan går till 
nån fond och dom ber att samhället ska lösa ut dom? Det är ju så det kan 
tolkas. Så att det är ju en väldigt fin balansgång att gå på. Alla kan se 
vinsterna, men här finns enormt stora risker. Jättestora risker (Interview B, 
2014). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
